Re:NIST Selects Winner of Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA-3) Comp...
by tptacek on Tuesday October 02, 2012 @10:15PM
(#4605489)
Regarding the bits exposed to inputs in Keccak, I read the claim in the same manner as the claim that CTR is more side-channel resistant because attacker ciphertext bits never hit the AES core; here further margin is given by the additional capacity bits. That's my attempt at exposition from the Sponge paper. You would know far better than I would, though; I'm a tester, not a cryptographer.
Regarding length extension, strong disagree; we see the SHA functions routinely abused this way.
Re:NIST Selects Winner of Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA-3) Comp...
by dchest on Tuesday October 02, 2012 @09:52PM
(#4605408)
BLAKE and Skein inject a message block by first running it through the block cipher (as key in BLAKE, as plaintext in Skein), and then XORing the result with the message block to get a new state. JH XORs message block into one half of the state before permutation, and into the other half after it. Keccak XORs message block into a part of state before permutation, and that's it.
Also, your explanation of the sponge structure omits the real difference between it and MD: It is a transform that turns a non-compressing function (f in that diagram) into a compressing function. MD, on the other hand, starts with a fixed-input-size compressing function and extends its domain.
By the way, what do you mean by "Furthermore, Keccak's Sponge design derives security by only allowing inputs to directly influence a subset of the internal state bits."? That's as true for an MD-type construction as it is for a sponge construction. In fact, it's a crucial fact that allows us to build a reduction from, say, the collision-resistance of MD[f] to the collision-resistance of f.