Let's say that they are 100% correct, we parse the subtext as text, it was totally him.

We still do not know the critical details of how (and when) he stored the root password he copied out of their password manager (encrypted in his own password manager? on his pwned laptop? in dropbox? we'll never know!) therefore the whole chain of custody is still broken.

The leading contender to replace RubyGems has Andre Arko as a charter member, so this all seems very salient.

Right but that speaks more to Andre's character, IMO.

Why are you copying a password out of a shared vault that should only be used in break-glass type scenarios? It's that's not planning for possible malicious action in the future, I don't know what is.

You can try and excuse it as having your own break-glass for the break-glass, but that's on the spectrum between irresponsible and incompetent.

Again, if the accusation is true, removing him was justifiable from any possible perspective you might have.

The other subtext is that they literally have no idea how to run rubygems securely... And what to do in case of a security incident...

I'm addressing the question of whether we all had better assume all the RubyGems published after this incident were compromised, and my response is "that is probably not rational since the actor in this scenario had all this access legitimately just days beforehand". The rest, I don't care.

Look, it's enough to know that Rubygems did not require 2FA before August 2022. There were gems with millions of downloads with owners without 2FA on their accounts. I think your initial assumption is pretty safe even without the ongoing fiasco.

The other other subtext is that this sure is an effective distraction from their governance problems, and muddies the waters. Given the utter lack of trust I have for anything the Ruby Central folks say at this point, given the amount of spin and misinformation they've spread already, my default assumption is that this is an excuse to malign someone who may well have had legitimate access, in the process of claiming that you're locking things down, which was always the excuse being made for kicking people out.

At this point, it looks like everyone involved, not just RubyCentral, contributed to the governance problems over many years https://archive.md/SEzoV

> Regarding Arko’s blog post about his removal, McQuaid [Homebrew Maintainer] told me it’s good that Arko is crediting other people for their contribution and that he’s following open source principles of community and transparency, but that “his ‘transparency’ here has been selective to things that benefit him/his narrative, he seems unwilling or unable to admit that he failed as a leader in being unwilling or unable to introduce a formal governance process long before this all went down or appoint a meaningful successor and step down amicably.”

Update: https://andre.arko.net/2025/10/09/the-rubygems-security-inci... is pretty much exactly the kind of thing I expected here. Person with legitimate access doing their job, organization flailing around in the process of kicking people out that should never have been kicked out in the first place.

He changed the AWS root account password; RC implies they had to go through a reset flow to recover the account. This apparently went on for more than a week. I don't know how to reconcile what Arko is claiming with what RC is claiming.

Arko believed he was in the right to do so, and while he probably should've reached out sooner to notify them of the "precaution" he was taking, the fact that they didn't notice for almost two weeks shows how unserious they are about security

It seems to me like the inherent trust in open source software is a big problem. Reliance on software maintained by strangers, sometimes just one individual, and not reading/understanding the code before running it.