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Re:Active NPM supply chain attack: Tinycolor and 40 Packages... by wrs on Monday September 15, 2025 @10:17PM (#45257296)
Some packages have install scripts that actually need to run (e.g., esbuild).

pnpm refuses to run install scripts from packages you haven’t manually authorized, which helps a bit.

Re:Active NPM supply chain attack: Tinycolor and 40 Packages... by efortis on Monday September 15, 2025 @10:50PM (#45257505)
Yes, at the end of that blog there are two options for that:

  npm install --ignore-scripts=false package-i-trust

Or, trigger the installation script:

  node node_modules/puppeteer/install.js
Re:Active NPM supply chain attack: Tinycolor and 40 Packages... by wrs on Tuesday September 16, 2025 @12:51AM (#45258141)
The pnpm version of this is persistent. You approve the package once, and regular install works thereafter. Which is nice.
Re:Active NPM supply chain attack: Tinycolor and 40 Packages... by DemocracyFTW2 on Tuesday September 16, 2025 @03:49AM (#45259288)
is that permission tied to a specific version with a specific fingerprint/hash? because if it's not then you could still get a surprise come the next update...
Re:Active NPM supply chain attack: Tinycolor and 40 Packages... by wrs on Tuesday September 16, 2025 @04:04PM (#45267258)
It is by package name, but at least you won't be surprised when left-pad suddenly has an install script.

You can put a fingerprint on the package dependency itself, though, so if you add a fingerprint to anything you approve the install script for, you will get that level of safety.

Re:Active NPM supply chain attack: Tinycolor and 40 Packages... by lrvick on Tuesday September 16, 2025 @02:54AM (#45258902)
pnpm cannot be built from source without an existing pnpm binary making it ineligible for inclusion in any reproducible Linux distro, for good reason, as there is no way to rule out a trusting trust attack.

Pnpm should be considered for hobby use cases only.