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A comment on Memory Integrity Enforcement. Parent comment

Re:Memory Integrity Enforcement by jrtc27 on Tuesday September 09, 2025 @09:49PM (#45192097)
Can you elaborate on what you perceive as broken?
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Re:Memory Integrity Enforcement by saagarjha on Wednesday September 10, 2025 @03:31AM (#45194424)
mremap?
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Re:Memory Integrity Enforcement by quotemstr on Wednesday September 10, 2025 @01:07PM (#45200684)
Add a a sliding window aliasing mode to the hardware? You'd set a page table bit saying "check capabilities not against my VA, but those VAs over there"
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Re:Memory Integrity Enforcement by jrtc27 on Wednesday September 10, 2025 @08:21PM (#45206036)
You may wish to read what the current pure-capability CHERI Linux user ABI specifies for mremap(), because we (primarily Arm, in conjunction with us) have thought about this, and the conclusion is not "the existence of mremap() makes CHERI undeployable". See https://git.morello-project.org/morello/kernel/linux/-/wikis...
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