Re:Google disables compression for OpenSSL in Chrome - SSL e...
by luu on Wednesday September 12, 2012 @01:17PM
(#4511745)
If you've got a provably secure protocol, what's the problem with formally verifying the implementation of the protocol?
I work in an area where bugs are very scary, so we use formal verification, and that's on top of having many more testers than developers.
From the perspective of this naive outsider, I'd would have expected FV to be worth it for security sensitive protocols. Is it that the protocols are too complex to be verified, or is it just not considered to be worth the effort?
Re:Google disables compression for OpenSSL in Chrome - SSL e...
by tptacek on Wednesday September 12, 2012 @01:21PM
(#4511759)
I'm not making an argument against formal methods. I'm saying that if you replaced TLS with a protocol with a design proof, you could easily end up less secure.
I work in an area where bugs are very scary, so we use formal verification, and that's on top of having many more testers than developers.
From the perspective of this naive outsider, I'd would have expected FV to be worth it for security sensitive protocols. Is it that the protocols are too complex to be verified, or is it just not considered to be worth the effort?