Analysis of the GFW's Unconditional Port 443 Block on August 20, 2025

Re:Analysis of the GFW's Unconditional Port 443 Block on Aug... by gorgoiler on Wednesday August 20, 2025 @04:37AM (#44959945)

How is traffic controlled inside PRC? Is GFW a central hub for all traffic between all hosts? Or between residential ASNs and commercial ones only? In the UK and Iran a lot of censorship was implemented by leaning on ISPs at IP level (eg BT Cleanfeed) and with DNS blocks but I haven’t kept up to date with how networks might handle residential hosting. Maybe internal traffic is just all banned?

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Re:Analysis of the GFW's Unconditional Port 443 Block on Aug... by kotri on Wednesday August 20, 2025 @05:28AM (#44960239)

> How is traffic controlled inside PRC?

Unknown. I haven't seen any injected fake DNS or reset packets so far to domestic hosts. But there are rumors that Google's servers in Beijing (AS24424) was once black holed.

> Is GFW a central hub for all traffic between all hosts?

It's supposed to has centralized management system, but not a single hub.

> Or between residential ASNs and commercial ones only?

Yes, the injecting devices are deployed in IXPs, the AS borders. See <Internet censorship in China: Where does the filtering occur?>.

> In the UK and Iran a lot of censorship was implemented by leaning on ISPs at IP level (eg BT Cleanfeed) and with DNS blocks but I haven’t kept up to date with how networks might handle residential hosting.

I believe Iran has more centralized system like China controlled by Tehran.

> Maybe internal traffic is just all banned?

No, internal HTTPS traffic is not banned in that hour.

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Re:Analysis of the GFW's Unconditional Port 443 Block on Aug... by inemesitaffia on Wednesday August 20, 2025 @05:25AM (#44960218)

It's in operators but managed by the regional government.

So what's blocked differs by region

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