Re:Vaultwarden commit introduces SSO using OpenID Connect
by surge on Friday August 15, 2025 @11:01AM
(#44913301)
I've threat modeled this myself, and as I understand it the Bitwarden client side decrypts/encrypts everything locally. So even if backend was entirely compromised, it's never getting anything without the master password, and that's never sent across by the client. Then again, there's also the web interface.
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Re:Vaultwarden commit introduces SSO using OpenID Connect
by ronnier on Friday August 15, 2025 @11:13AM
(#44913435)
Yeah if an attacker was able to insert javascript then it's possible.
Re:Vaultwarden commit introduces SSO using OpenID Connect
by blr_lpm on Friday August 15, 2025 @11:46AM
(#44913828)
For this particular threat vector, where the client is compromised, the backend doesn’t matter.
Re:Vaultwarden commit introduces SSO using OpenID Connect
by franga2000 on Friday August 15, 2025 @01:45PM
(#44915322)
A compromised server can inject exfil code into the web page it serves. If you only ever use the apps then you should be fine though.
Re:Vaultwarden commit introduces SSO using OpenID Connect
by 9cb14c1ec0 on Friday August 15, 2025 @04:10PM
(#44916799)
Which is only possible if logging into the web client and not when using the bitwarden desktop app or browser extensions.