Yes, that's what I'm saying. I also think there's a clear sense in which asking whether machines can think is a question about capabilities, even though we would need a more precise definition of "thinking" to be able to answer it.
So that's how I'd sum it up: we know the capabilities of submarines, and whether we say they're swimming or not doesn't answer any further question about those capabilities. We don't know the capabilities of machines; the interesting questions are about what they can do, and one (imprecise) way of asking that question is whether they can think
The second half of the sentence contradicts the first. It can't be a clear question about capabilities without widespread agreement on a more rigorous definition of the word "think". Dijkstra's point is that the debate about word definitions is irrelevant and a distraction. We can measure and judge capabilities directly.
Agreed, and I've made this point a few times, so it's ironic we're going back and forth about this.
> The second half of the sentence contradicts the first.
I'm not saying the question is clear. I'm saying there's clearly an interpretation of it as a question about capabilities.
> if that's what we mean by the question whether a machine can think
That's the issue. The question of whether a machine can think (or reason) is a question of word definitions, not capabilities. The capabilities questions are the ones that matter.