SRAM Has No Chill: Exploiting Power Domain Separation to Steal On-Chip Secrets

Re:SRAM Has No Chill: Exploiting Power Domain Separation to ... by hulitu on Saturday July 26, 2025 @02:34PM (#44696092)

> So attach that intermediate voltage on the VCC pin closest to/running the SRAM and pull the plug on everything else.

Isn't easier to just read the password from the hard drive ? You already have access.

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Re:SRAM Has No Chill: Exploiting Power Domain Separation to ... by alex-robbins on Tuesday July 29, 2025 @12:53AM (#44719195)

The use case for this is similar to the cold boot attack, e.g. disk is encrypted but memory is not. (And I don't know how encrypted DRAM works, but I wouldn't be surprised if some implementations put the key in SRAM that can be dumped using this technique.) Anyway, there may be valuable secrets that exist in SRAM but but not on disk.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cold_boot_attack

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