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Re:Google says "not a security vulnerability", quickly fixes... by Eikon on Friday July 04, 2025 @03:13AM (#44461928)
This is not true,

1. Operator correctly runs: cat /dev/urandom > seed.bin

2. Filesystem corruption fills seed with nulls/spaces (happens in production)

3. Sunlight silently generates predictable keys from corrupted seed

4. CT log operates "normally" - valid signatures, no errors

5. Anyone knowing about corruption can recreate the private keys

What other "end-user" crypto-related app runs with a user-produced seed to generate key pairs on the fly?

Re:Google says "not a security vulnerability", quickly fixes... by dodomodo on Friday July 04, 2025 @04:46AM (#44462549)
this is out of scope for the project, it is insane to expect every software project to deal with random file system corruptions. if this kind of thing was considered a security vulnerability we would have 100x the vulnerabilities we have now.
Re:Google says "not a security vulnerability", quickly fixes... by Eikon on Friday July 04, 2025 @11:30AM (#44465385)
There's a distinction between "Corrupted seed" and corrupted PK / password. The seed is provided without validation or checksuming, generating perfectly valid keys on the fly from unknown entropy quality.

If you have bad entropy (partially or fully corrupted/weak seed), you'll generate valid-looking keys that are actually insecure.

There's a reason there's not a single "end-user" crypto-related app / cli tool or server that takes a user-specified arbitrary seed as input. That's dangerous, broken design.

Why would you even do that?