No it wasn't. It was reading (and xoring into the randomness that would become the key being generated) uninitialised char values from an array whose address was taken, that results in unspecified values not undefined behaviour.
No, they XORed data from a bunch of entropy sources into an intermediate buffer (that was never initialised, because the whole point of it was to be random) and then XORed that into a buffer from which the key was made. Debian's patch removed that final XOR. It wasn't a bug in the original code (other than being hard to understand).
Can you please read about the issue before commenting more?
No it wasn't. The patch removed the read of the randomness buffer that folded it into another buffer (the MD_Update calls) because Valgrind was warning that the buffer it was reading from had never been initialised.
> Can you please read about the issue before commenting more?
Right back at you.
(meanwhile, long before this incident fedora just compiled openssl with -DPURIFY which disabled the bad behavior in a safe and correct way).
Last I knew Debian didn't do dedicated security review of patches to security-critical software, which is normal practice for other distributions.