Re:A Formal Analysis of Apple's iMessage PQ3 Protocol [pdf]
by modeless on Friday May 09, 2025 @12:15AM
(#43933737)
Yes but when Messages in iCloud is enabled that "client-side" encryption key is itself included in your iCloud backup (that Apple can read), as disclosed. So Apple can read your messages regardless of whether you enable or disable Messages in iCloud. The only things that prevent it are disabling cloud backups entirely, or enabling ADP. But unless everyone you message also does the same, Apple still has your messages.
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Re:A Formal Analysis of Apple's iMessage PQ3 Protocol [pdf]
by tgma on Friday May 09, 2025 @12:18AM
(#43933751)
Good to know, hence my 95% certainty. Fortunately for me, each new device starts with DFU restore and installation of my own Configuration Profile which supervises the device, disable automatic pairing with new devices, disables useless apps like Game Center, and most importantly disables iCloud Backup entirely, etc.
Re:A Formal Analysis of Apple's iMessage PQ3 Protocol [pdf]
by bouke on Friday May 09, 2025 @01:52AM
(#43934145)
How do you make backups of your data; e.g. Photos, Notes and Messages?
Re:A Formal Analysis of Apple's iMessage PQ3 Protocol [pdf]
by tgma on Friday May 09, 2025 @12:03PM
(#43938334)
You could always sync and backup (make sure it has a password so that keychain data is stored in the backup) your iPhone to your Mac since the dawn of iPhone OS. You can still use iCloud sync for contacts and notes if you choose to for convenience, but I absolutely do not want iCloud backup.
Re:A Formal Analysis of Apple's iMessage PQ3 Protocol [pdf]
by gU9x3u8XmQNG on Friday May 09, 2025 @01:04AM
(#43933941)
How are you achieving this? I’d like to know more. Thanks in advance.
Re:A Formal Analysis of Apple's iMessage PQ3 Protocol [pdf]
by tgma on Friday May 09, 2025 @01:09AM
(#43933960)
Perhaps I should document it and link to it in detail but basically you use Apple Configurator to create a profile and set its restriction flags accordingly and keep it somewhere you can redeploy with ease and simply DFU restore the iOS device so that it gets the latest clean iOS image. After that you don’t activate it by going through the setup screen. Instead you use the connected Mac with Apple Configurator to “Prepare” the device and the computer activates it and pairs it with your “organization” public key and you can add the profiles you created in the previous steps to apply the configuration restrictions. It’s like having an enterprise MDM except you don’t need a server just the local profile is enough.
Re:A Formal Analysis of Apple's iMessage PQ3 Protocol [pdf]
by ronnieboy493 on Friday May 09, 2025 @01:33AM
(#43934054)
> Perhaps I should document it and link to it in detail
Would be very interested in this.
Re:A Formal Analysis of Apple's iMessage PQ3 Protocol [pdf]
by tgma on Friday May 09, 2025 @01:45AM
(#43934100)
Feel free to send me a note to the email in the profile. I will make sure to link to you when I get to documenting this.
Re:A Formal Analysis of Apple's iMessage PQ3 Protocol [pdf]
by crazymalhavoc on Friday May 09, 2025 @11:00AM
(#43937538)
Yes please, document this, this sounds great!
Re:A Formal Analysis of Apple's iMessage PQ3 Protocol [pdf]
by EduardoBautista on Friday May 09, 2025 @04:06AM
(#43934743)
No, that's not what it means. The key is stored on their server, but you still need to provide a password to unlock the key. In the same way that you can password protect an SSH key.
It's also the same way ProtonMail encrypts their email. They have to store the private key for you to be able to use the email on any browser.
Re:A Formal Analysis of Apple's iMessage PQ3 Protocol [pdf]
by tgma on Friday May 09, 2025 @12:01PM
(#43938307)
This is demonstrably false: you can restore an iCloud backup on a new device without the original device password. Only with iCloud credentials which can be reset by Apple.
Only enabling ADP, disabled by default and unavailable in UK, makes it like you describe.