>Again, no one is proposing monitoring everyone all the time.

I repeat: that ship has sailed

>I drove 300 miles in rural Virginia, then asked police to send me their public surveillance footage of my car. Here’s what I learned.

https://cardinalnews.org/2025/03/28/i-drove-300-miles-in-rur...

Automated license-plate readers are a completely different topic

And yes, I oppose those also, in large part because they are 1) a general dragnet against every traveler, 2) have zero specificity to any particular individual, and 3) have no judicial check or due process on their use.

Adding an individual device to an individual's car after repeated breaking of laws (and perhaps more importantly, repeated failures to keep it discreet enough to not be repeatedly caught) has zero of those properties. It is for a specific individual, for a specific time, after due judicial process. As long as it stays confined to those parameters, it seems more acceptable than many alternatives.

Do you apply the same logic to backdoors in encryption? I am sure you could say no one is proposing implementing and using back doors on the general public as a whole, as they would only be for criminal elements. The reason that people oppose this is because the shift from only affecting criminal elements to affecting everyone is so easy to do that nothing would stop it once the infrastructure is in place.

It is extremely difficult to have a backdoor for encryption that only applies to some people, and no proposal for encryption backdoors AFAICT differentiate based on whether the subject has previously committed a crime. They are always blanket backdoors.

There is no difference between applying this to only criminals and applying it to everyone else. Vehicles are already being made with software speed limiters that users can control (e.g. Tesla vehicles). Once the state controls these, there is no technical barrier preventing it from only being applied to criminals.

The only real difference is that old vehicles need to be retrofitted, while the hardware and software needed to do this is largely already present in new vehicles (or soon will be in the remaining exceptions on the market).

OF COURSE NOT!

It is impossible to implement a backdoor to a broadly-used encryption method for only specific criminal individuals - it is being implemented across the entire usage base.

Adding a device to a specific criminal's vehicle for a limited time is highly specific.

I absolutely oppose any general application, and am favorable towards the slippery slope argument. I'm only responding to the above comment which falsely claims that we've already gone entirely down the slippery slope.

Is this merely adding a device to a criminal’s vehicle? What stops manufacturers from including speed limiters by default to make it easier to retrofit cars? Then what stops a switch from being flipped to enable it for all cars regardless of “criminal” status? Unlike breathalyzers, which had an economic barrier from reaching step 2, a software limiter has no economic barrier.

A user controllable software limiter is already in Tesla vehicles for example. It would not take much to go from it being user controllable to being controlled by state law. That brings us to an issue analogous to the issue opponents of backdoors in encryption want to avoid, which is that there is nothing stopping it from being used indiscriminately.

>>Is this merely adding a device to a criminal’s vehicle?

For the topic of the post, YES

The article was specifically about laws allowing a JUDGE to add a device to a specific convicted person's vehicle for a limited time.

OF COURSE there is the slippery-slope argument you describe very well.

The slippery slope danger is real, and I've stated that I oppose any motion down it.

But I also oppose posts which wrongly scream that we have already slid down it entirely when in fact the article is about taking a single limited step down the slope.

Descending every slippery slope is not inevitable. Falsely declaring that it's already done is at best a strawman argument.

Yet, evidently as soon as any surveillance topic comes up, hordes of HNers are happy to discard reading comprehension and act as if any hint that a step might be taken onto a slippery slope is a full endorsement of speedrunning down it.

With encryption backdoors, you only need two steps, and the second step is on the honor system, which is why people resist the first step. With this, it looks like there are more than two steps, but given that all future cars will effectively support this in software and will be internet connected such that it can be enabled remotely, we really only have two steps. It only appears to be multiple steps because older cars need retrofits, but again, that is not the case for all cars, and especially is not the case for future cars. Once we are in the future, it will be clear that this first step that seems so benign is the only step where there was any difficulty and the second step can be done with ease.

That is also making a lot of assumptions that all cars will soon be mandatory internet-connected.

I expect there will be a LOT of push-back on that one, and there are still also many areas without cell coverage. Would you expect all cars would stop running without cell coverage?

Here's at least one entirely new car, with Bezos' backing, that AFAICT will have zero internet connection. [0] Considering the cost trajectory of cars, and the general distaste for surveillance, a low-cost car without those add-ons may be very popular.

And, AGAIN, the point was entirely about the GP post's massive exaggerations, not about a general implementation which I strongly oppose. You and GP evidently think it is OK to exaggerate and speak like every bad thing related to the topic has already happened; I think at least some adherence to the facts makes sense. It seems we'll have to agree to disagree. Particularly since we do seem to agree on the broader topic that general implementation of speed limiters is awful and to be avoided

[0] https://www.caranddriver.com/news/a64564869/2027-slate-truck...

Mandatory internet connections are not needed when navigation systems and infotainment systems are making internet connections increasingly common.

Backdoors for encryption have mathematical impossibilities relying behind them. Speed regulators on cars are not mathematically impossible. Your analogy is fatuous, like most HN analogies. Argue the actual incident, not your made up analogies.

You seem to have ignored that the analogy was applied to the slippery slope aspect of this where cars start having this built into them by default and then it is enabled for all cars at some point afterward without due process.

Come on, ALPRs violate privacy of drivers.