How does the server know that the handshake request is not malicious? Resetting 2FA by request effectively voids the whole concept does it not?
The counter becomes a shared secret --- but a dynamic and potentially unstable one. One failed request or one missed response and the counters on client and server are no longer in sync. Hence, a failure waiting to happen on an unreliable network.
In HOTP, the secret counter is not independent and must remain synchronized between client and server.
A counter that can be synchronized on demand is kinda superfluous --- not really secret and not terribly relevant either. All else being equal, an attacker can sync up just as easily as a legitimate client so why bother with the counter?
I expect HOTP exists somewhere out there in the real world but I have yet to encounter it. Every 2FA I have actual experience with has been TOTP.
A unique counter for each authorization attempt ensures the resulting key is different for each attempt, which makes replay attacks not possible. I agree if you sync the counter two ways, it is better to use a "nonce", a totally random secret each time.
What I don't get is how HOTP is anything but a fail waiting to happen if used across an unreliable network. Maybe this explains why I have yet to encounter a real world deployment of HOTP.