RFC4226 and RFC6238 do not specify anything but the actual algorithm(s), which is exactly what OP implemented.
I agree that an asymmetric key makes much sense. Secret key can be left at the user device while server only contains the public key. That sounds much more secure. I will dig deeper!
True about the stuffing proteciton, I actually want to do further reading on how TOTP is secured from random attacks. Statistically you are expected to crack 1 account in every 1 million attempts in 6 digits codes. Those numbers look pretty huge in the context of security, and a bot-net can potentially brute force couple hundred accounts every day.
You can probably come up with something related to S/KEY (which was kind of a precursor to HOTP) that can be made to work with arbitrary sized one time passwords and is technically asymetric (and quantum resistant at that), but the security trade-offs involved in that and somewhat wild user registration step of S/KEY make HOTP/TOTP more sane choice.
If you additionally made it so that you couldn't phish the security key -- by having the OS + web browser know which apps can ask for which security keys -- you'd have reinvented WebAuthn.
Another key part of FIDO2 phishing protection is challenge-response. The relying party sends some random material/nonce that the authenticator has to sign. This avoids replay attacks that e.g. a time-based method would have, since when a phisher tries to authenticate, the RP will send a different nonce and the phisher cannot sign it.
Incidentally, if you think of TOTP as being HMAC(unix mod 30, secret), one idea would be to do public key crypto instead of symmetric HMAC stuff. That's basically what a security key is.
If you additionally made it so that you couldn't phish the security key -- by having the OS + web browser know which apps can ask for which security keys -- you'd have reinvented WebAuthn.
P.S.: Make you sure you have stuffing protection in place against these kinds of six-digit-code auth schemes. A million possibilities is often acceptable for a secondary factor, but it's useless if attackers can just try all million codes.
Since they're in the thread, nice article 'dogacel! I've never seen an article on this that also took the time to dig into HMAC internals and that gnarly DT function.