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Re:The DNS-Based Authentication of Named Entities Transport ... by peterwwillis on Wednesday August 08, 2012 @02:26PM (#4357172)
It's too bad it's based on DNSSEC. There's too many flaws and roadblocks for widespread adoption. If there was a compelling requirement for its use maybe it would get implemented everywhere in a number of years.

The biggest problem [to me] with relying on DNSSEC in current day systems is the non-verifying stub resolver in certain operating systems, which allows for a man in the middle attack at the client's first hop. https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4033#section-7

Re:The DNS-Based Authentication of Named Entities Transport ... by donavanm on Thursday August 09, 2012 @12:53AM (#4359575)
> It's too bad it's based on DNSSEC.

Yup, that about covers it. My favorite DNSSEC feature is TLDs and .govs continually fucking it up.

More seriously this vs CAs is just a philosophy argument. CAs are a club of grandfathered "trusted" parties. This is single source .govs and other TLDs for the trusted party. Yay. Currently I, personally, can choose to not trust Verisign and go with another CA. In this world I can trust Verisign, because they own .com, or go fuck myself. Clearly a win.

Oh well soon enough some jackass will put this in a FISMA or PCI DSS requirement and everyone will support it anyways.