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Re:Taming the UB Monsters in C++ by IshKebab on Monday March 31, 2025 @08:11AM (#43534040)
> I think the sudden and almost exclusive focus on memory safety is weird.

They're clearly panicking about people switching to Rust. I don't think it's surprising. Too little too late though; you can't just ignore people's concerns for decades and then as soon as a viable competitor comes along say "oh wait, actually we will listen to you, come baaack!".

> There are lot of things compromising my online safety and freedom, and certainly memory safety issues are not very high on this list.

Out of the things that programming languages can solve, memory safety should be very high on your list. This has been proven repeatedly.

Re:Taming the UB Monsters in C++ by uecker on Monday March 31, 2025 @08:26AM (#43534179)
I don't see people panicking in my vicinity. I see some parts of the industry pouring money into Rust and pushing for memory safety. I agree that memory safety is nice, but some of the most reliable and safe software I use on daily basis is written in C. I am personally much more scared of supply chain issues introduced by Rust, or other issues introduced by increased complexity (which I still think is the main root cause of security issues).
Re:Taming the UB Monsters in C++ by galangalalgol on Monday March 31, 2025 @10:21AM (#43535383)
If you only need what is in the c std library the number of rust crates you use will be tiny and all from authors within the foundation. The hash gets stored in your repo, so any rebuilds where a dependency repo got compromised and tried to modify an existing version will fail. If you are using a c library that isn't std, then you will probably pull in 10x to 20x the number of dependencies in rust, but not substantially more authors. The risk is real, but if you treat it like c and minimize your dependencies it isn't any riskier, probably less. If you get tempted and grab everything and the kitchen sink you can still be reasonably safe by using the oldest version of crates you can compile with that don't have any cve. That is made easier with crates like cargo deny and cargo audit.

All that said, I would love a language that had the same guarantees and performance without the complexity, but I don't see how that could work. There is definitely extra stuff in rust but the core capabilities come from the type system. Getting the same safety any other way would probably require a purely functional language which has performance costs in any implementation I am aware of along with a runtime being necessary. If you can afford that, then we don't need a new c, we have those languages.

Re:Taming the UB Monsters in C++ by steveklabnik on Monday March 31, 2025 @11:49AM (#43536389)
To put an even finer point on it, crates.io releases are immutable, and so the only scenario in which you are even in a place where someone could try and modify a release is if you're depending on a git repo directly.
Re:Taming the UB Monsters in C++ by uecker on Monday March 31, 2025 @11:42AM (#43536327)
I believe the practical difference to 100% memory safety that Rust offers in theory, or the 99% memory safety you get in practice when using unsafe, compared to the 98% memory safety you can get today when writing decent modern C using abstractions such as string type and modern tooling is pretty irrelevant compared to all the other issues. Yes, the numbers are totally made up, but nothing I have seen so far convinces me that the reality is a lot different. Of course, there is a lot of old crappy legacy C code, and there will even be a lot of new crappy C code, but there will also be pretty bad Rust code. Now, if you like Rust, more power to you, I have no issue with people prefering Rust. But I think arguments for having to write in Rust for security reasons are mostly based on a series of fallacious arguments.
Re:Taming the UB Monsters in C++ by steveklabnik on Monday March 31, 2025 @12:16PM (#43536705)
> Yes, the numbers are totally made up, but nothing I have seen so far convinces me that the reality is a lot different.

This is really what a lot of all of this comes down to, Herb and the committee feel like you do, others feel that the numbers won't be that good. We'll see in time!

Re:Taming the UB Monsters in C++ by IshKebab on Monday March 31, 2025 @01:01PM (#43537216)
> We'll see in time!

If by "in time" you mean last year then yes...

https://security.googleblog.com/2024/09/eliminating-memory-s...

Re:Taming the UB Monsters in C++ by steveklabnik on Monday March 31, 2025 @01:43PM (#43537650)
I meant the opposite, the claim by sutter et al is that new C++ code that uses these new techniques will show the same results as this study shows for MSLs.
Re:Taming the UB Monsters in C++ by IshKebab on Monday March 31, 2025 @02:09PM (#43537924)
Oh I see. Yeah I agree. That's going to be a long time!
Re:Taming the UB Monsters in C++ by IshKebab on Monday March 31, 2025 @12:09PM (#43536625)
> Yes, the numbers are totally made up

Indeed.

> but nothing I have seen so far convinces me that the reality is a lot different

https://www.memorysafety.org/docs/memory-safety/#how-common-...

This is very well studied.

> Of course, there is a lot of old crappy legacy C code

Ahh... you don't make mistakes. I see.

Re:Taming the UB Monsters in C++ by uecker on Monday March 31, 2025 @12:53PM (#43537136)
I don't think anything "studied" there addresses my point.