Re:Malware found on NPM infecting local package with reverse...
by robinsonb5 on Wednesday March 26, 2025 @06:59PM
(#43488451)
In my world (VHDL/Verilog and some C/C++) there's a difference between the "fetch" and "build" steps. It's perfectly reasonable for the fetch step to require network access; the build step should not.
The real problem is that some language ecosystems conflate those two steps.
Re:Malware found on NPM infecting local package with reverse...
by fc417fc802 on Wednesday March 26, 2025 @07:03PM
(#43488481)
I'm mostly on board with that dichotomy except that I think it's also important that all fetched artifacts either come from a VCS or are similarly cryptographically versioned and all historical versions made available in a reliable manner.
Re:Malware found on NPM infecting local package with reverse...
by robinsonb5 on Wednesday March 26, 2025 @07:10PM
(#43488545)
Yes, absolutely - I can't disagree with that.
Re:Malware found on NPM infecting local package with reverse...
by fc417fc802 on Wednesday March 26, 2025 @06:59PM
(#43488455)
> at least by default
Even in C/C++ after changing the relevant parameters to non-default values things often break. It seems those configurations often go untested.
Google managed repos are a nice exception to this. Clearly documented commit hashes for all dependencies for a given release.
You can cache and/or emulate the network to go offline but fundamentally a fresh build in most languages will want to hit a network at least by default