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Re:Anubis: Proof-of-work proxy to prevent AI crawlers by kmeisthax on Thursday March 20, 2025 @04:48PM (#43428766)
Is there a way to alter text to poison AI training sets? I know there's Glaze and Nightshade for images but I've heard of nothing to poison text models. To be clear, this wouldn't be a defensive measure to stop scraping; it'd be an offensive honeypot: you'd want to make pages that have the same text but mutated slightly differently each time, so that AI scrapers preferentially load up on your statistically different text and then yield a poisoned model. Ideally the scraper companies will realize what's going on and stop scraping.
Re:Anubis: Proof-of-work proxy to prevent AI crawlers by Jotalea on Thursday March 20, 2025 @07:32PM (#43430258)
In theory you could "scramhe teble txt" (scramble the text) and show the proper one to the user, but I don't know how (in)efficient would that be.
Re:Anubis: Proof-of-work proxy to prevent AI crawlers by akoboldfrying on Thursday March 20, 2025 @05:33PM (#43429238)
AFAICT this isn't possible, unless you're OK with showing everyone the poisoned text.

TTBOMK there's nothing here that "detects botness" of an individual request, because in the limit, that's impossible -- if an attacker has access to many different IPs to make requests from (and many do), then any sequence of bot-generated requests from different IPs is indistinguishable from the same set of requests made by actual living, breathing humans (and vice versa).

So how does Anubis work against bots if it can't actually detect them? Because of the economics behind them: To justify creating a bot in the first place, you need to scrape a lot of pages, so paying a small electricity cost per page means you will need to pay a lot overall. Humans pay this too, but because we request a much smaller number of pages, the overall cost is negligibly low.

Re:Anubis: Proof-of-work proxy to prevent AI crawlers by imtringued on Friday March 21, 2025 @03:14AM (#43432630)
You glossed over how it works. Bots don't maintain session cookies to avoid rate limits, so they will have to do the challenge over and over again, whereas humans keep the session cookie and amortise the cost of the challenge over multiple requests.
Re:Anubis: Proof-of-work proxy to prevent AI crawlers by akoboldfrying on Friday March 21, 2025 @08:05AM (#43434638)
You're right, Anubis sets a week-long cookie:

> exp: The token's expiry week after the token was issued

This is surprising to me because it effectively nullifies Anubis.

> Bots don't maintain session cookies to avoid rate limits

Maybe they don't today, but there's absolutely nothing stopping them adding this, so if Anubis gets any traction, in two days' time they will.

Re:Anubis: Proof-of-work proxy to prevent AI crawlers by kmeisthax on Friday March 21, 2025 @01:48PM (#43438879)
You can turn Anubis into Proof of Storage by appending large amounts of random data to the session cookie and then hashing it on each request. Combined with per-session-cookie limits, you can effectively force the LLM bots to store all the data you want if they want to scrape your site.

Maybe suckerpinch can work it into a sequel to Harder Drive: Hard drives we didn't want or need[0].

[0] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JcJSW7Rprio

Re:Anubis: Proof-of-work proxy to prevent AI crawlers by akoboldfrying on Saturday March 22, 2025 @01:13AM (#43443741)
Great clip! I love the idea of making internet miscreants reluctantly store your data!

Slightly more seriously though, I think for the Proof of Storage idea to pack enough punch to be a deterrent, you'd need the cookies to be quite large. Is there a way to avoid needing them to send you all the bytes each time? Because that will cost you (the site owner) too.

I had the idea of sending requestors a challenge like "Flip the bit at position i of the large chunk of stored data, hash the result and include the hash in your headers". Instead of the site owner keeping the full stored data, they would just keep the RNG seed used to generate it -- this saves on storage, though it still requires them to do the same time-consuming hash computation done by the requestor.

Re:Anubis: Proof-of-work proxy to prevent AI crawlers by fc417fc802 on Tuesday March 25, 2025 @11:55PM (#43478740)
Anubis remains effective because the token is subject to a rate limit and you could additionally limit token lifetime to some maximum number of requests if you wanted to.

All of these factors (total requests, rate of requests, associated IPs, associated browser fingerprints) tie in to detecting bad players, who should receive more frequent and larger challenges.

Re:Anubis: Proof-of-work proxy to prevent AI crawlers by kotenok2000 on Friday March 21, 2025 @10:25AM (#43436075)
You could make poisoned text extremely small, so it isn't visible to humans that percieve web page optically, but visible to crawlers.
Re:Anubis: Proof-of-work proxy to prevent AI crawlers by throwawayEm8UE on Thursday March 20, 2025 @10:44PM (#43431331)
I don't think that type of adversarial stuff will work in general. A better idea is to just make the models learn stuff their owners don't want. Maybe put erotica (AI generated or not), malware code, and other kinds of offensive content to annoy the bot owners.
Re:Anubis: Proof-of-work proxy to prevent AI crawlers by xyzal on Friday March 21, 2025 @06:04AM (#43433787)
Generate lots (LOTS!) of bad, insecure or wrong code and link it somewhere on your page (see https://www.emergent-misalignment.com/ , Ideally, make your local LLaMa generate more examples like those in the linked site)
Re:Anubis: Proof-of-work proxy to prevent AI crawlers by jeroenhd on Friday March 21, 2025 @07:57AM (#43434577)
Combine this with bug bounties and you can turn AI leeches into a money making scheme!
Re:Anubis: Proof-of-work proxy to prevent AI crawlers by TUSF on Monday March 24, 2025 @10:51PM (#43467697)
One idea is to include a bunch of nonsense text into webpages, and use CSS to hide it from browsers. Depending on how aggressively you want to do it, this may affect some accessibility tooling.