I'm not sure how this could exploited by just making a PR, unless you for some reason have secrets enabled for builds by unknown contributors, which obviously would be a mistake. Usually, only builds using secrets only run on certain branches which has a known contributor approving the code before it gets there.
> people mistakenly assume that git tags are immutable
If you're distributing a library on GitHub used by many other people/projects, then you really need to setup `protected branches` and `protected tags`, where you can prevent changes somewhat.
> I'm not sure how this could exploited by just making a PR, unless you for some reason have secrets enabled for builds by unknown contributors
In this context the renovate bot would be making the PR to a repo it had been installed on, making it a trusted contributor able to trigger CI builds on its PRs.IME, this will be more "learned" than "reminded". Many many people set up pipelines to build artefacts based on tags (e.g. a common practise being "on tag with some pattern, then build artefact:$tag") and are just surprised if you call out the flaws.
It's one of many practises adopted because everyone does it but without basic awareness of the tradeoffs. Semver is another similar case of inherited practise, where surprisingly many people seem to believe that labelling software with a particular string magically translates into hard guarantees about its behaviour.
This won't help in this case though, because a legitimate bot was tricked into working with a rogue commit; a tricked bot could as well sign a tag with a legitimate key.
"Immutable tags" of course exist, they are commit hashes, but they are uninformative :(
EDIT: seems GitHub has finally noticed (or started to care); just went to test this and auto merge has been seemingly disabled sitewide. Even though the setting is enabled, no option to automerge PRs shows up.
Seems I was right to worry!
It’s such an obvious attack vector, I’m pretty sure I tested GitLab soon after the feature initially rolled out.
Example: https://github.com/chains-project/maven-lockfile/pull/1111/f...
This appears to be governed by the `pinGitHubActionDigests` helper configured in `renovate.json`.
The affected repo has now been taken down, so I am writing this partly from memory, but I believe the scenario is:
1. An attacker had write access to the tj-actions/changed-files repo
2. The attacker chose to spoof a Renovate commit, in fact they spoofed the most recent commit in the same repo, which came from Renovate
3. Important: this spoofing of commits wasn't done to "trick" a maintainer into accepting any PR, instead it was just to obfuscate it a little. It was an orphan commit and not on top of main or any other branch
4. As you'd expect, the commit showed up as Unverified, although if we're being realistic, most people don't look at that or enforce signed commits only (the real bot signs its commits)
5. Kind of unrelated, but the "real" Renovate Bot - just like Dependabot presumably - then started proposing PRs to update the action, like it does any other outdated dependency
6. Some people had automerging of such updates enabled, but this is not Renovate's default behavior. Even without automerging, an action like this might be able to achieve its aim only with a PR, if it's run as part of PR builds
7. This incident has reminded that many people mistakenly assume that git tags are immutable, especially if they are in semver format. Although it's rare for such tags to be changed, they are not immutable by design