Re:Popular GitHub Action tj-actions/changed-files is comprom...
by yencabulator on Friday March 14, 2025 @11:22PM
(#43369704)
Pledge is for self-isolating, it helps with mistakes but not against intentional supply chain attacks.
[ Parent
| on HN ]
Re:Popular GitHub Action tj-actions/changed-files is comprom...
by hypeatei on Friday March 14, 2025 @11:30PM
(#43369750)
How so? Obviously this is ineffective at the package level but if the thing spawning these processes, like the GitHub runners or Node itself added support to enter a "restricted" mode and pledged then that would help, no?
Re:Popular GitHub Action tj-actions/changed-files is comprom...
by _flux on Saturday March 15, 2025 @04:48AM
(#43371065)
According to https://www.openbsd.org/papers/eurobsdcon2017-pledge.pdf pledge turns off upon execve. Surely it would be quite limiting for runners to use it.
As far as I see its purpose is mostly a mitigation/self-defence for vulnerabilities in C-based apps, so basically limiting what happens once the attacker has exploited a vulnerability. Maybe it has other uses.
It could be used defending against bugs in the Node runtime itself, as you say, but as I understand vulnerabilities in the Node runtime itself are quite rare, so more fine-grained limitations could be implemented within itself.
Re:Popular GitHub Action tj-actions/changed-files is comprom...
by ratmice on Saturday March 15, 2025 @10:33AM
(#43372791)
I'm not much of an openbsd user, but I have been meaning to understand if this is the hole execpromises is intended to fill.
At the very least, I think execpromises was added a year after the documentation that you linked, so it's worth looking into.