> While I speculated that TrustZone was being used, exclaves may well use the existing SPTM and GXF (Guarded Execution) privilege levels after all. One implication may be that there is no hard reason they couldn't be supported on iPhone 13 and higher, aside from RAM requirements and development effort. Make no mistake these are huge undertakings even for Apple.
It’s important to note that most of those CVEs are to do with vulnerable software that manufacturers put in the TrustZone protected environment (many of which are garbage). There are very few vulnerabilities reported about the hardware itself.
If you're a phone designer, and you're going to put unlock PIN validation into a trusted execution environment? Sure, makes sense. If you're going to put your widevine DRM code into a trusted execution environment? I guess.
But why did they make a design that means a vulnerability in the DRM code allows an attack on the PIN validation code? That means the attack surface is huge.
You gotta keep these clowns separated if you don't want them spraying each other with water and throwing pies down each other's trousers.
Recent Apple phone and laptop SoCs include hardware support for nested virtualization, including the M4 iPad Pro where an exclave is used for the camera LED. Hopefully the next revision of the Apple Platform Security guide will cover SK exclaves and baseband mitigations for Wi-Fi radar sensing, https://help.apple.com/pdf/security/en_US/apple-platform-sec...
150+ TrustZone CVEs, https://www.cve.org/CVERecord/SearchResults?query=trustzone
> it’s a defensive effort on a larger scale than any other end user device manufacturer is currently attempting
Google implemented pKVM on Pixels with hardware nested virtualization a few years ago, and upstreamed the code to Linux mainline, including cooperative de-privileging of TrustZone relative to pKVM L0. But they have not announced defensive features using pKVM/AVF, outside of Debian "Linux Terminal" VM.