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Re:How to distrust a CA without any certificate errors by lxgr on Friday March 07, 2025 @09:07AM (#43290262)
You have to trust whoever you got an Onion link from, and yourself to not fall for a similar-looking one, since it is the trusted private key.

It's a web-of-trust and/or TOFU model if you look at it closely. These have different tradeoffs from the PKI, but don't somehow magically solve the hard problems of trusted key discovery.

Re:How to distrust a CA without any certificate errors by Spivak on Friday March 07, 2025 @11:16AM (#43291408)
Sure but the web is already TOFU even with CAs because the only thing being asserted is that your connected to someone who (probably) controls the domain.

The client is perfectly able to verify that when connecting without a central authority by querying a well-known DNS entry. Literally do what the CA does to check but JIT.

This does leave you vulnerable to a malicious DNS server but this isn't an impossible hurdle without re-inventing CAs. With major companies rolling out DoH all you care about is that your DNS server isn't lying to you. With nothing other than dnsmasq you can be your own trusted authority no 3rd party required.

Re:How to distrust a CA without any certificate errors by lxgr on Friday March 07, 2025 @11:23AM (#43291475)
The web PKI is not TOFU in any way: Neither do most browsers offer a convenient way of persistently trusting a non-PKI-chaining server certificate across multiple site visits, nor do they offer a way to not trust a PKI-chaining certificate automatically.

The essence of TOFU is that each party initiating a connection individually makes a trust decision, and these decisions are not delegated/federated out. PKI does delegate that decision to CAs, and them using an automated process does not make the entire system TOFU.

Yes, clients could be doing all kinds of different things such as DANE and DNSSEC, SSH-like TOFU etc., but they aren't, and the purpose of a system is what it does (or, in this case, doesn't).

Re:How to distrust a CA without any certificate errors by Spivak on Friday March 07, 2025 @11:43AM (#43291667)
Web PKI is not TOFU in the specific instance where you have an a priori trusted url you know about. But I, and others, argue that this isn't actually that strong of a guarantee in practice. I'm just trusting that this URL is the real life entity I think it is. The only thing you get is that you're connected to someone who has control of the domain. And it's pretty clear that with ACME and DNS challenges we don't need a huge centralized system to do this much weaker thing, you just need any DNS server you trust, it can even be yours.
Re:How to distrust a CA without any certificate errors by lxgr on Friday March 07, 2025 @11:51AM (#43291747)
> The only thing you get is that you're connected to someone who has control of the domain.

Yes, that's the entire scope of the web PKI, and with the exception of EV certificates it never was anything else.

> it's pretty clear that with ACME and DNS challenges we don't need a huge centralized system to do this much weaker thing

Agreed – what we are doing today is primarily a result of the historical evolution of the system.

"Why don't we just trust the DNS/domain registry system outright if we effectively defer most trust decisions to it anyway" is a valid question to ask, with some good counterpoints (one being that the PKI + CT make every single compromise globally visible, while DANE does not, at least not without further extensions).

My objection is purely on terminology: Neither the current web PKI nor any hypothetical DANE-based future would be TOFU. Both delegate trust to some more or less centralized entity.

Re:How to distrust a CA without any certificate errors by dooglius on Friday March 07, 2025 @01:14PM (#43292577)
You also have to trust where you get a non-onion link from?
Re:How to distrust a CA without any certificate errors by lxgr on Friday March 07, 2025 @01:27PM (#43292735)
Yes, but non-Onion links are slightly more memorable.

That's not to say that domain typo attacks aren't a real problem, but memorizing an Onion link is entirely impossible. Domains exploiting typos or using registered/trademarked business names can also often be seized through legal means.

Re:How to distrust a CA without any certificate errors by nullpoint420 on Friday March 07, 2025 @05:34PM (#43295538)
Can we not map regular domain names to onion links? DNS except instead of regular DNS mappings of URLS -> IP Addresses it's URLS -> Onion URLs?

Or maybe we return to using bookmarks? Not sure exactly.