> The legal world does not move as fast as the demands of our CA ecosystem. Our legal approach was to work with the complainant’s legal team to get the TRO dismissed in 5 days.
The court would not have dissolved the TRO in anywhere close to 5 days without the complainant's cooperation, even if Digicert had an ironclad argument for doing so. Digicert made the right choice to get the certificates rotated as fast as possible - and I don't think Sectigo intends to argue it would be better to stand on principle even if that makes the revocation slower.
... isn't that exactly the legal button the complainant pushed to prevent the revocation?
Temporary restraining orders are the biggest exception. If DigiCert is about to do something crazy like take down all your websites, courts are generally willing to put a temporary stop to it without understanding all the details. "Preserve the status quo" and "prevent irreparable harm" are the buzzwords.
So if DigiCert's irreparable harm was great would that prevent it? Like legally requiring CAs to follow their revocation policies or pay millions in damages?
So a customer could go right ahead and get a TRO but long term it will cost them less than making sure their infrastructure can handle this rare event?
For all the back and forth in the CAB thread, it doesn't seem we're any closer to finding an escape valve for that, which seemingly would have to come from the CAB because there isn't even really a mechanism for courts to decide not to issue TROs about cert revocation, short of somehow taking a case around this to the Supreme Court (which isn't going to happen).
As Digicert has repeatedly explained, this is simply how the United States legal system works. Courts have broad and indisputable power to issue temporary restraining orders, and the parties to a case must comply even if doing so violates some promise they made to a third party. (The point of the TRO is to maintain the status quo while the court figures out details like what promises have been made to who.) People in the PKI community who believe that some carefully written policy would enable CAs to reject an invalidation TRO, or convince a court that they cannot issue it, are wrong.
The reason it's never come up before is that no CA had previously attempted to enforce a widespread 24 hour revocation caused by its own error.