It's important because there are so many opportunities for error in serving arbitrary files out of a filesystem with some rough and ready script.
For example, if you are serving files out of the same filesystem that holds your configs and secret keys then you should be a bit nervous. You have to get the permissions right and make sure you don't have anything improper under a directory which you are publishing as a whole. If your users are uploading files to the same place you should feel really nervous.
There are too many easy ways for people to be negligent and screw this up. In the context of designing an opinionated framework, you accept a lot of social liability and you are really dropping the ball if you are setting up tired and ignorant users to screw up this badly, without even a warning in the docs to think about what you are doing.
With n script languages and m static file serving implementations per language, there are now (n*m) obscure packages to audit. Not counting their combinations...
Your idea to just "fix the insecurity" and remove any warning from the docs means to do things which you merely believe to fix the insecurity, and then overlook the underlying risks of the approach.
I am also not sure you are right when you suggest that there cannot be any performance (or reliability) impact of pushing static serving into some script library. Just as these are not audited they are also not nearly as likely to be benchmarked and tuned.
If there is a reason to serve static files out of script, that reason will be because of some positive reason (like convenience or the need for some particular flexibility) rather than some vague sense that using Apache is "obsolete".
So if this is a security sin, they've already encouraged its widespread commission. A bit of "don't do this" or "don't do this in production" hand-waving in the docs don't resolve a security problem, if there's a real vulnerability in the current implementation.
On the other hand, committing to the idea that the bundled staticfiles app may be used this way -- that in fact it's a good and modern way to operate, in production, once you have an inbound proxy cache -- would mean accepting deeper responsibility. It would give up the hedge, "if there's a security bug, we warned you!". It's not taking on n*m obligations: it's taking on 1 language, 1 module. And it's not even a new module or an obscure need... it's exactly the sort of thing an opinionated framework can solve for people.
The old opinion -- "take this risk in development, but by the time you get to production use the 'best practice' of a separate static server" -- should be updated to a new opinion -- "the 'best practice' is now a front-end proxy cache, which makes the performance benefits of an extra static server negligible, so we're no longer going to assume everyone will do that in production".
An admonition against using other less-tested code to achieve the same effect would still be appropriate. But not nonspecific FUD about the framework's own code -- that it is "probably insecure". Anything that's truly "probably insecure" ought to be fixed.
But I disagree with you that the best practice should change from a static server to a front-end proxy cache. Rather, the best practice should consist of using both.
An important concept in security is deperimeterisation- the idea that you shouldn't assume you have a fixed border, inside of which is secure. So by all means, use a front-end proxy cache. But also put some effort into hardening your individual servers, treating them as if they will be operating under a full load.
Interestingly, we extended the collectstatic command in many ways to perform minification, combination of assets, generation of sass and javascript variables (based on settings in python), etc. It's part of our deployment and if we were serving static files through django, we would still have to run a similar command.
I'm also happy that nginx is handling file uploads, aliasing, redirection, virtual hosting on different IPs and Ports with different access control, real ip extraction (when behind a load balancer), etc.
I'll be following more closely this trend of moving static asset hosting from a regular web server to the application container, but I believe that web servers like nginx and apache can do a lot more than just serving static files (at least, in complex deployment scenarios).
Not also, though, that a service like CloudFlare now puts some of these optimizations (minification, asset-combination, obfuscation, etc) into the cache layer, as optional cloud 'app' services to be enabled/disabled/paid-for as desired.
Not saying that way is better for all, but it has potential as a convenience for some, getting those same expert-level optimization benefits while retaining a simple project/deployment structure.
Nor should it be. There are plenty of WSGI capable web servers that can be installed into a Django project as apps.
If you want to run just Django behind a frontside cache and server static media from the same connection, simply install an appropriate app. Gunicorn and cherrypy both 'drop in replacements' for the built in runserver and both well up to the task.
I propose that staticfiles under gunicorn is a reasonable choice. Further, if fronted by a inbound proxy cache, it could perhaps even be the reference/recommended setup for high-volume production sites, rather than the current doctrine that such sites should have some extra static-collect/export to a helper server.
I think those optimizing habits are now obsolete: best practice is to have a front-end cache.
A corollary is that we usually needn't worry about a dynamic framework serving large static assets: the front-end cache ensures it happens rarely.
Unfortunately it's still the doctrine of some projects that a production project will always offload static-serving. So for example, the Django docs are filled with much traditional discouragement around using the staticfiles serving app in production, including vague 'this is insecure' intimations. In fact, once you're using a front-end cache, there's little speed/efficiency reason to avoid that practice. And, if it is specifically supected to be insecure, any such insecurity should to be fixed rather than overlooked simply because "it's not used in production".