Does it really make sense to hold my bank to the same standard as a real estate website? Sure they should all reach some minimum requirement (salted and hashed passwords), but I expect my bank to have far higher standards (e.g. two factor auth) than a a random site.
I guess the issue is that the layman cannot really tell how secure a solution is, and so are unlikely to be able to make well reasoned decisions about the information they release. As such there really needs to be a far greater level of responsibility placed on people who hold the keys so to speak. Once again this is especially true since people re-use (and use overly simple) passwords at a scary rate. By not protecting their information on a crappy real estate website you are potentially leaving open their bank to abuse.
I feel instances like these just show dangerous levels of incompetence and a blatant disregard for user's information. Good solutions generally require less work anyway so there's no excuse.
Amusingly enough, the banks who impose PCI compliance on merchants aren't themselves required to be PCI compliant, and some of them will happily e-mail you extremely sensitive customer data (no matter how many times you ask them not to), even though doing so yourself would violate PCI compliance.
> This is especially true with the high amount of password reuse that goes on.
I do agree that it is a bit off (read: probably illegal) that they allow users to change the password and then store the user's password in plaintext. The system would be considerably better if users could only use a system-generated password.
All private user information is equally private. To arbitrarily suggest that certain data is less important is a dangerous road to walk down. We should be holding everyone to the same standards when it comes to security.
This is especially true with the high amount of password reuse that goes on.