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Re:~/.osx updated — sensible hacker defaults for OS X Mounta... by thought_alarm on Saturday July 28, 2012 @09:46PM (#4307203)
Under what scenario is it ever unsafe to open a text document in TextEdit? Under what scenario would you ever not completely ignore that warning?

A much more likely threat is a malformed jpg or pdf designed to exploit a decoder, in which case the executable bit is completely irrelevant. Warning the user about the executable bit protects them from nothing, unless Finder is preparing to execute the file itself. It is a warning that is always ignored, and pointless warnings only make the system less secure.

And working with multiple quarantined documents exposes more bugs.

It's not a thoughtfully designed feature. If they ever fix it I would gladly reenable it.

Re:~/.osx updated — sensible hacker defaults for OS X Mounta... by Someone on Sunday July 29, 2012 @03:50AM (#4307832)
TextEdit could have a bug in its 'guess the character encoding' code that leads to a buffer overflow, or it could have a bug handling malformed UTF-8.

Its 'guess the character encoding' code also might have a 'wait a minute, this is RTF/PDF' feature.

Of course, Apple could trust its own apps, but I think they should not (why increase the attack surface?) and that would lead to complaints "why can't I tell this OS that my text editor can be trusted?".

I also think (but have no data on it) that this "open a .txt file you downloaded" check is very rare for 'normal' users. If they download at all, it is Word documents, PDFs, movies, and applications.

Re:~/.osx updated — sensible hacker defaults for OS X Mounta... by LinaLauneBaer on Sunday July 29, 2012 @08:20AM (#4308247)
Isn't TextEdit sandboxed in Lion + Mountain Lion? If so TextEdit most likely cannot execute any non signed code or open a network connection... But of course sandboxing should only be used as a last resort. I am not a security expert - can anyone comment on that?
Re:~/.osx updated — sensible hacker defaults for OS X Mounta... by pooriaazimi on Sunday July 29, 2012 @01:18PM (#4309033)
My .txt's open with Sublime, which is not Sandboxed (or maybe is, I don't know). They can't de-quarantine .txt's because the default is to open with TextEdit!
Re:~/.osx updated — sensible hacker defaults for OS X Mounta... by Evbn on Sunday July 29, 2012 @01:34PM (#4309084)
And that bug would not be triggered by the execute bit, so an exploit would have a non-exe attack vector