Re:A tale of several distros joining forces for a common goa...
by uecker on Saturday February 08, 2025 @03:26PM
(#42985882)
The xz backdoor was news because they went to a lot of effort to try to hide a backdoor in the source (actually a binary file in the source) and still failed. In contrast, without reproducible builds it is trivial for a maintainer with upload rights (or somebody who managed to get the credentials from a maintainer) to insert a backdoor into a binary. And it is then virtually impossible to detect.
Re:A tale of several distros joining forces for a common goa...
by rcxdude on Saturday February 08, 2025 @07:13PM
(#42987343)
Well, the xz backdoor was detected through the behaviour of the resulting binaries, not through observation of the source code tampering, so I don't think it's a great example.
Re:A tale of several distros joining forces for a common goa...
by uecker on Saturday February 08, 2025 @08:15PM
(#42987627)
Fair point. It was pure luck that it was discovered. What I was referring to mainly was how much effort it took to get the backdoor installed in the first place, compared to simple uploading a compromised binary somewhere.
I think the actual main utility is that the process has done a very good job of rooting out several causes of unintentional nondeterminism in the build process. I say unintentional because the two main causes of unreproducibility, by several orders of magnitude, are timestamps being embedded everywhere and absolute paths being embedded everywhere, and those are rather expected. But some of the unreproducibility comes from things like accidental reliance on inodes in file paths (i.e., doing "for file in listdir()" without sorting the results of listdir) or the compiler itself accidentally sorting based on pointer address (which is unreproducible on ASLR systems).