Not really. Most people still would rely on signatures because they can't be expected to compile everything from scratch just to verify their download is authentic. Moreover even though reproducible builds make verification easier, it still requires someone to sound the alarm. For less popular packages there might be nobody checking any particular build is backdoored, because most people see "reproducible builds" and they assume Somebody Else is doing the reproduction.
you still may not trust the public gobuilds instance. my hope is that people (eg software projects themselves, or distros, or other kinds of communities) will run & use their own gobuild instances and verify their builds against the public gobuilds service. win-win: gives them assurance their builds are really reproducible, and builds trust in the public gobuilds (keeping it honest, if someone sees a hash mismatch, they will speak up).
i usually don't get much enthusiasm for it though. (:
I don’t know whether I’d spend this much work on such an abstract goal, but what reproducibility changes really is quite amazing. It vastly increases trust in published binaries and obviates the need for signing and the security benefit of compiling software yourself.