Ok, yes, there were some algorithms in the past which had problems with carrying input biases to their output and sometimes even getting totally broken with certain seeds/keys. Nowadays, this isn't the case, and the view is that such issues are fundamental weaknesses rather than mere errata to be worked around.

However, the quality of a modern CSPRNG doesn't save you from a low-entropy seed. A couple biased bits in a 128-bit seed may not be a serious issue (but why take the chance?!), however good entropy estimation is a difficult task which is best left to the operating system. Modern operating systems will ingest sources of hardware randomness and seed their system-level CSPRNGs, which should then be used directly by application software (for key material) or as seeds to local CSPRNGs (for less security-sensitive but more performance-sensitive needs). Do not play around with seed entropy just to be clever.

In the absence of a full-fledged operating system, then things like high-precision boot timers can be used for seeds, but only because there's nothing better available. The lack of good randomness is a real problem in resource-constrained environments, though usually there are easier-to-exploit vulnerabilities that get hit first.