It's one thing for shareholders to say if under the CEO's leadership, the company's value rises by 100 million dollars, they'll give him a $10 million bonus. I can see how a board could approve that - it's a lot of money, but it's linked to performance.
But should they also say that if the company's value falls by 100 million dollars, and they decide to fire the CEO, they'll give him a $2 million bonus? How is it in shareholders' interests to reward bad performance?
Doesn't do much to explain severance packages though?
Unless the board wants to give a signing bonus, but the amount is so egregious the shareholders would riot, so they need to do it by stealth.
If everyone they interview agrees to play the same game (and they do), it becomes a "necessity to attract top talent".
But the justification for a lot of the incentives we give capital is "they shoulder all of the risk", and when your risk is walking away with a severance package that is often many multiples of the median lifetime earnings of the American male, you aren't really dealing with any real risk.
If you try to change this, you'll hear screeching about how there's just too much risk and the "job creators" will just take their capital and ideas to more business-friendly legal climes.