There is a clean solution to this problem: the proxies should serve as just-in-time CAs for the traffic they proxy. The big proxy products all do that. This simply isn't Chrome's problem.
Considering your use of the word "breakage": DannoHung is talking about a button that is actively being disabled in certain situations, not something bad being enabled. This is extra code in a security critical part of the browser. Thus, we can assume that there were meetings that discussed this "feature" and its implications, the actual coding, code reviews and QA, adding up to quite a bit of opportunity cost. That begs the question: Would this time have been better spent on something that adds more security?
Disabling manual overrides may seem like a good idea, but it can go horribly wrong. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lufthansa_Flight_2904
If he wants to disable TLS security, there's a right way to do it: by installing the proxy's cert.
If you read 'agl's talk, you'd see that the reason the button is hidden is that it is one of the Internet's great security flaws: a workflow embedded into most browsers that demands users to learn to disable TLS security.
So, I find this argument you're making to be more or less entirely bankrupt.
Of course, I would still only run with "--ignore-certificate-errors" for the limited time the proxy has broken certificates or whatever...
Companies have their firewall infrastructure locked down (hopefully), but lan segments (except in high-security environments) not as much.
When connecting to a Known HSTS Server, the UA MUST terminate the
connection with no user recourse if there are any errors (e.g.
certificate errors), whether "warning" or "fatal" or any other error
level, with the underlying secure transport.
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-hodges-strict-transport-sec...