Another technology to start preparing for is TACK. It allows you, the server owner, to control browser pinning of your certs while maintaining CA mobility. This gives you the control over your security that Google has over Gmail via Chrome cert pinning without having to issue a new browser build every time you change CAs.
One way to think of it is like a domain transfer lock but with cryptography. You control how you unlock your pin to allow mobility to a new CA by sticking a signed file on your SSL server.
[Disclosure: one of the authors of TACK is a former co-worker.]
I think the first problem gets considerably easier to solve once the latter is in place, and there's a lot we could do with Convergence-like systems that would make them more deployable if TACK is adopted.
In the short term, however, TACK stands on its own, and we hope it's a fairly uncontroversial proposal that will be easy to integrate into the ecosystem.
//www.example.com/path/to/asset.js
this will then use the same transport as the containing page uses.
At Quantcast we tried to use "//" without the protocol in our tags (to eliminate the need for a separate http: and https: tag), but we had a huge number of complaints about a bug in our tag (missing http:!). Users also tried to be helpful and add in the "http:" and then complained when it broke. In the end we went with two separate tags to reduce the support burden, despite the added complexity of having to explain the two tags.
Less than a year ago, you were saying HSTS wasn't worth the trouble. Ref: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=2909613
Glad you've changed your mind.
https://www.ssllabs.com/projects/best-practices/
I encourage everyone to read through it, and follow it. Once you know what to do, it's easy. Part 2, dealing with advanced topics, is coming in October.
* Enable HSTS
* Don't link to HTTP:// javascript resources from HTTPS pages
* Set the secure flag on cookies
Very few of the sites we test enable HSTS. But it's easy to do; it's just an extra header you set.
The only quibble I might have is the fatalism he has about mixed-security Javascript links. I'd go further than he does: when you source Javascript from a third party, you have leased your users security out to that third party. Don't like the way that sounds? Doesn't matter: it's a fact. Companies should radically scale back the number of third parties that they allow to "bug" their pages.