Re:We Cracked a 512-Bit DKIM Key for Less Than $8 in the Cloud
by littlestymaar on Thursday January 09, 2025 @02:52PM
(#42649245)
512 was known to be too low for a looong time, why do you think it was the export-grade security?
1024 being at risk against state-level adversaries isn't shocking to anyone, but there's a significant gap between this and costing $64, and this gap is much bigger than 10 years of Moore's Law (NSA had much more than 32*$64 of available compute ;).
You're making grandiose claims and there's nothing that holds in your reasoning, it really feels like I'm discussing physics with a flat-earther…
Meanwhile, ~10 years ago https://weakdh.org/imperfect-forward-secrecy-ccs15.pdf
After a week-long precomputation for a specified 512-bit group, we can compute arbitrary discrete logs in that group
in about a minute.
We find that 82% of vulnerable servers use a single 512-bit group, allowing us to compromise connections to 7% of Alexa Top Million HTTPS sites. In response, major browsers are being changed to reject short groups. We go on to consider Diffie-Hellman with 768- and 1024-bit groups. We estimate that even in the 1024-bit case, the computations are plausible given nation-state resources.