You're probably right that it makes less sense from today's perspective
If you are able to do that whatever security you got from NAT has been breached even before NAT hole punching enters the conversation.
NAT will block unsolicited incoming connections, that is a great boon for security but obviously not a silver bullet for all network related security issues nor outgoing connections. That has never been a trope.
Why doesn't it make sense to you? From my perspective the idea was that the NAT protects your devices - and your device is now punching a hole into this protection, making it vulnerable to the world wide web
This circumventing doesn't have to be done by a malicious actor, it just comes at the added risk of becoming "targetable" from the Internet
It has no bearing on security.
>it just comes at the added risk of becoming "targetable" from the Internet
That is not how NAT holepunching works.
Please explain why the ability to establish an outgoing connection through NAT, when you already have a sidechannel, is a security issue?
If a NAT made a device unreachable from the Internet, it'd be more secure then a device that's reachable.
You could theoretically leave management ports unsecured etc, because there is no danger - they can't be reached after all.
It just turned out that techniques such as NAT hole punching were developed, which made this rationale invalid. Because your devices could still become reachable.
Yes, this specific technique requires a an active part on both ends, but this active part can be something completely innocent, such as an activeX applet in Internet explorer 6.
Or a Freeware they installed, and now opens up the whole network, not just the device is installed on.
This is all from the very beginnings of the Internet, things weren't as explored back then, and that's why NATs were considered a security feature back then.
Modern malware is obviously much more advanced so we intuitively know why it was never really providing any safety. Hackers were mostly doing things for bragging rights, cryptolockers weren't a thing, the current default malware setup of having command hosts that compromised hosts check for new commands to execute weren't even thought of. In these times, NAT looked like a security feature, because it kinda looks like it.
That's true. The actual problem are symmetric NATs where every peer sees a different port number. This makes traditional NAT-traversal impossible and you have to resort to port guessing/scanning. See for example https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/document?repid=rep1&type=pdf&d...
Also, wouldn't it be easier for stateful firewalls to block simultaneous TCP open (intentionally or not)? With UDP, the sender's firewall must create a connection as soon as it sends off the first packet, even if that packet bounces off the other firewall: the timing doesn't have to be particularly tight. But with TCP, the firewall might plausibly wait until the handshake is complete before allowing incoming packets, and it might only allow the 3-way SYN/SYN-ACK/ACK instead of the simultaneous SYN/SYN/ACK/ACK.