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A comment on iTerm2 critical security release. Parent comment

Re:iTerm2 critical security release by godelski on Thursday January 02, 2025 @10:24PM (#42582010) 

  > The same class of issue can occur for any other project
This class of issues sounds like the prolific class of

  DON'T WRITE TO /tmp
Which is why systemd has a private tmp option

https://salvatoresecurity.com/the-many-perils-of-tmp/

https://systemd.io/TEMPORARY_DIRECTORIES/

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Re:iTerm2 critical security release by 0xbadcafebee on Thursday January 02, 2025 @10:49PM (#42582184)
Safely writing to /tmp/ was solved in 1986. Personally I would consider this class of bug the "idiot software developer" class (or to be more charitable: "security-illiterate software developer"). My evidence? There are (at least) six different OS primitives that will avoid this bug.
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Re:iTerm2 critical security release by godelski on Friday January 03, 2025 @02:47AM (#42583525) 

  > Safely writing to /tmp/ was solved in 1986
If you RTFA you'll read (under "What is the issue?")

  > This file, /tmp/framer.txt, may be readable by other users on the remote host.
This is EXACTLY a non-safe writing to /tmp

Yes, there are safe ways to write to /tmp, as described in the systemd link I provided, but no, it is not safe to naively write to /tmp. Same issue as the "Many Perils of /tmp" link I provided.

A solution that no one uses is not a solution.

If you're gonna be arrogant, you better also be right.

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