Customers like Tel Aviv International Airport, who actually care to some meaningful extent about improved detection, are a small minority segment of the overall market. Creating new technical measures able to demonstrate improved performance in rigorous objective tests on the metrics these customers care about (some sweeter spot on the matrix of false pos, false neg, true pos, true neg, net throughput, cost) would be valuable but only to that small segment.
Of course I suspect venues really don't care about false negative rates much at all, so there's a big temptation for everyone to just turn sensitivity down.
Engineering exists to solve a problem. It's entirely likely that your definition of the "problem" differs from that of the paying customer.
Or they just need to convince most of their customers it will be safe to attend, while covering their ass by following "best practices" if something slips through, people get hurt and they get sued.
Apparently, you've never met my Aunt Sue. She has a graduate degree in innumeracy with a minor in illiteracy and a specialization in worrying about whatever the media tells her to worry about. However, she always votes.
More seriously, it's not cost-effective to "convince most customers it will be safe enough to attend." The game theory around fallacious public perception makes it a losing proposition for a politician or company to ever be seen as reducing security requirements because as soon as "rare bad thing happens", you will be blamed - even though your reduction in pointless measures had no bearing on it. Every independent expert agrees that securing cockpit doors makes subjecting every passenger to the TSA's increased security measures unnecessary and, objectively, a very poor ROI in both cost and disruption. However, the TSA will never, ever go away - even though it could and should. Yes, this is frustrating.
I think it would be a good idea to create an explicit carve out in the law saying that there is no premise liability for a property owner or event organizer due to a third party committing a crime.
Codifying that expectation in law would reduce costly and obnoxious security theater. Of course, a business advertising a certain level of security could be sued for failing to provide it.
Edit: to be clear, I don't think there's anything actually stopping someone from attempting to sue a bar or grocery store over a crime committed there, but it usually doesn't happen and would likely be an uphill battle for the plaintiff.
"business owners meeting definition X are only liable in conditions Y"
No shit.
Another problematic case this sort of liability leads to is hotels in Las Vegas routinely searching guest rooms after a lawsuit following the 2017 shooting. I don't think it's desirable to expect hotels to search rooms or to call the police if someone has "too much" luggage. That's paranoid, an invasion of privacy, and unlikely to prevent a future mass murder.
I don't want a world where I have to submit to searches to go anywhere or do anything, and I hope that's not a fringe position.
If I wanted to respond to the idea that premises liability should be eliminated then I would have responded to your first post.
And I actually do think that most people would call your position a fringe position once you actually start talking details like "but what about guns in schools?" If you truly believe that you shouldn't have to submit to a search to go ANYWHERE or do ANYTHING then you hold a fringe position.
It appears routinely searching students in public schools is fairly rare in the USA; under 8% use metal detectors[0]. That certainly does not mean they're allowed to bring guns, just that they probably won't be discovered if they do.
This means that nobody should be searched when they go anywhere or do anything, and if they aren't and someone gets shot by a third party, stabbed by a third party, or mugged by a third party then there is no liability to the business/landowner in any case. Ever. Searches will not be rare in practice, they will not occur. Airports? Never. Concerts? Never. Hotel rooms? Never. Schools? Never.
And hence we've already established the problem with your position and why it's fringe. Not even you can realistically argue for your own positions without caveats.
I am opposed to premises liability being a motivation for anyone to conduct searches. Liability isn't the reason searches are conducted at airports or courthouses to give a couple examples, so eliminating it would not eliminate those searches. Businesses also might have other motivations, such as making their customers feel safer; if that outweighs customers finding it annoying or offensive, some of those would likely continue.
> someone gets shot by a third party, stabbed by a third party, or mugged by a third party then there is no liability to the business/landowner in any case. Ever.
This does correctly state my position.
I assume expediting peak crowd throughput at low labor cost is the primary, if not entire, value of the device. I hate that it's being marketed dishonestly but I also assume most concert venue buyers know (or suspect) it probably doesn't work all that well in practice. However, in a concert context accurate detection isn't their main priority. They need to get more bodies per minute into the venue at lower cost while appearing to conduct security checks sufficiently 'real' enough to act as a deterrent to get those who care about getting 'caught' to leave their knife or concealed carry handgun (or whatever) in the car.
The only hard and fast requirement is meeting the contractual security requirements of the venue and promoter's insurance carriers - because no insurance = no concert. It's a bonus if the 'security' also looks plausible enough to reassure the small fraction of perpetually fearful people statistically challenged enough to actually worry about terrorists or an active shooter killing them while at a Taylor Swift concert (as opposed to the infinitely more likely chance of dying in a car crash on the way to the concert).
In a perfect world, everyone would be rational and numerate enough that we wouldn't need to maintain the pretense of 'security theater' in contexts where actual security isn't necessary. But in the imperfect world we live in, I prefer having concert (and airport) security be as minimally disruptive and inexpensive as possible regardless of effectiveness (since it's unnecessary and mostly ineffective in those contexts anyway). I just wish companies would sell these products as 'security placebos' instead of lying about it because fraud is wrong.