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Re:Varnish author criticizing HTTP/2.0 proposals by quotemstr on Tuesday July 17, 2012 @12:23AM (#4254081)
How so? A unique identifier is a unique identifier.
Re:Varnish author criticizing HTTP/2.0 proposals by ars on Tuesday July 17, 2012 @02:39AM (#4254449)
If the browser created the unique identifier instead of the server it could create a new one as often as necessary.

I think that would actually work very nicely.

Re:Varnish author criticizing HTTP/2.0 proposals by rmc on Tuesday July 17, 2012 @06:15AM (#4255050)
Browsers can do that now with cookies, by just clearing old cookies.
Re:Varnish author criticizing HTTP/2.0 proposals by angelbob on Tuesday July 17, 2012 @01:04AM (#4254173)
If you don't store a leakable cookie on the client and only use a connection ID (which is autoassigned by the server and cannot be easily forged) then a lot of cross-domain evil hackery goes away.
Re:Varnish author criticizing HTTP/2.0 proposals by danellis on Tuesday July 17, 2012 @02:40AM (#4254456)
I don't know what you mean by 'leakable' exactly, but you can already mark cookies as HttpOnly (not accessible from Javascript) and Secure (only transmitted over HTTPS).
Re:Varnish author criticizing HTTP/2.0 proposals by angelbob on Tuesday July 17, 2012 @03:44AM (#4254666)
"Leakable" in the sense that you can hand it to somebody else and they can actually use it.

A cookie is leakable because the client chooses to send it, so copying it to somebody else is really bad. A server-assigned per-connection ID is not leakable unless you can spoof the IP address of the one you're sending as.

Re:Varnish author criticizing HTTP/2.0 proposals by jvdongen on Tuesday July 17, 2012 @05:41AM (#4254940)
In principle you could already achieve that by binding a session (and corresponding cookie) to the client's IP address. No big deal.

Problem you may have is that some clients are behind proxy farms and can arrive with different source IP addresses within the scope of a single session.

If you do not bind the 'server-assigned-per-connection ID' to an IP address they become just as 'leakable' as a session cookie.

Re:Varnish author criticizing HTTP/2.0 proposals by vidarh on Tuesday July 17, 2012 @05:54AM (#4254983)
Doing server side IP checks is already easy, but in reality it can lead to massive amounts of user complaints when their sessions keep disappearing, because as it turns out, some user segments have a lot of users coming through proxies where each request is not guaranteed to come from the same IP.
Re:Varnish author criticizing HTTP/2.0 proposals by eli on Tuesday July 17, 2012 @08:02AM (#4255290)
Or their mobile device roams from WiFi to cell data.

I suspect anyone suggesting that an IP be part of the session security has never actually tried it on a large scale.

Re:Varnish author criticizing HTTP/2.0 proposals by angelbob on Tuesday July 17, 2012 @04:42PM (#4257774)
Sure. It'd be nice to have some kind of actual standard to at least make a good best guess here. Cookies are a really, really bad start.
Re:Varnish author criticizing HTTP/2.0 proposals by ay on Tuesday July 17, 2012 @10:22AM (#4255757)
Then a translation device at carrier assigns the client a different address. I heard first-hand that this is very annoying.
Re:Varnish author criticizing HTTP/2.0 proposals by pdeuchler on Tuesday July 17, 2012 @10:36PM (#4259094)
Of course, but the question is what that unique identifier denotes.

An IP address tells people who you are, where you are, and what you do.

A unique identifier ('+18El1iZRFCIiqRpfw4dJR8mXjJn2UxPrjwoRNpjSWg=' for instance) tells what you do without the who and where [1].

It's even possible advertisers could still target users based upon these identifiers, just without the background knowledge that makes these sorts of things privacy issues.

[1] I'll admit, it could be argued that the what can determine the who and where