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Re:Mise: Dev tools, env vars, task runner by Nullabillity on Sunday December 08, 2024 @06:29PM (#42361664)
> Precompiled, portable binaries are the way to go which is what mise is built on.

And where are those mystery meat binaries supposed to come from? What do you do if the provided binaries aren't enough? (Wrong version, wrong build flags, what you want isn't even packaged, don't support your platform, etc, etc, etc.)

Binary package managers have been tried over and over, and never work out well.

> gives your system a "split-brain" problem where you have the "nix world" and the "macos (or whatever) world".

Yeah no, that's inherent as soon as you bring in any kind of secondary package manager. Including pyenv or mise or whatever else.

Re:Mise: Dev tools, env vars, task runner by jdxcode on Sunday December 08, 2024 @06:35PM (#42361713)
> And where are those mystery meat binaries supposed to come from?

the vendor

Re:Mise: Dev tools, env vars, task runner by Nullabillity on Sunday December 08, 2024 @06:39PM (#42361725)
Right, because that never goes wrong.[0,1]

[0]: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=42351722

[1]: https://tukaani.org/xz-backdoor/

Re:Mise: Dev tools, env vars, task runner by goku12 on Sunday December 08, 2024 @10:06PM (#42362739)
The xz example does not support your case. Not only was every downstream build infected until it was discovered, it also needed a distro-specific modification (to openssh in Debian and Fedora, IIRC) to work at all.
Re:Mise: Dev tools, env vars, task runner by Nullabillity on Sunday December 08, 2024 @11:41PM (#42363122)
The xz backdoor relied on a discrepancy between the development repository and the released (source) artifact.

While skipping the released tarballs wouldn't have prevented the problem entirely, it would have made it much harder to hide.