[1] and also to stable branches, but not day-of-cve-announcement level of urgency.
Is it a precautionary concern that backporting patches gets more complicated if the vuln is in Rust code?
But then again Rust code isn’t even compiled by default so I guess I’m not sure why you’re bothering to support for old versions of the toolchain in mainline, at least this early in the development process. Certainly not a two year old toolchain.
That said we will probably switch to Debian rustc-web soon, and bump the lower limit to 1.75 or so.
The current approach basically guarantees that you're always targeting a ~2-4 year old version of the toolchain and that feels like a particularly weird maintenance burden given how many workarounds you're putting in to do so.
[1] https://launchpad.net/~jonathonf/+archive/ubuntu/rustlang
Anyhow starting April (August release) we will be able to target 1.75.0 while being consistent with QEMU's (C-targeted) distro support policies, which is not that bad. Maybe newer than that depending on what Ubuntu 22.04 does between now and August.
> QEMU has historically not made particularly timely security fixes either on mainline or on branches
> It's much easier for us to stick to making source releases, and delegate the job of providing binaries to our downstreams
Am I correct that this is essentially saying "we're going to do a snapshot of the software periodically but end users are responsible for applying patches that are maintained by other users as part of building"? Where do these security patches come from and how do non-Debian distros pick them up? Are Arch maintainers in constant contact with Debian maintainers for security issues to know to apply those patches & rebuild?