> did not try to use his backup radio.

Apparently accessing the backup radio is difficult, and even more difficult without the primary flight displays being operational - which his were not.

He wasn't in visual range of his wingman, who was following him.

So the whole "contact your wingman and follow them in for landing" thing seems like a stretch.

he was at very low altitude, struck by lightning, in a completely glass cockpit plane.

You don't "call your wingman" in that situation, you decide and you do. He didn't believe the plane was flyable, and in those conditions I don't think he had enough time or separation from the ground to make sure.

He was doing an instrument landing at the time. When the ILS switched off, he automatically aborted the landing as trained. This is a go–around, so you apply TOGA thrust, point the nose up, level the wings, raise the gear, and climb to 4000’ or whatever is the correct altitude for the TOGA procedure at the airport you are at. He was already 1200’ above the ground and climbing when he ejected. He was in a perfect level climb, he just wasn’t looking at his standby instruments and so he lost situational awareness for a few seconds. Glass cockpit or not, the standby instruments and fly–by–wire system were completely reliable in spite of the lightning.

> He was doing an instrument landing at the time. When the ILS switched off, he automatically aborted the landing as trained.

No, if you read the report, he was on final and, for whatever reason, instead of continuing the landing procedure he decided to change the aircraft mode to vertical landing and this caused the helmet to glitch.

The redacted version of the report does not state that there was any causal link between switching to SVTOL and the failure of the HMD. Only that the HMD happened to fail shortly after he switched modes:

    95. Approaching the final approach fix, the MFL made the radio call
    to convert the flight to Mode 4 (STOVL) and slow the flight to 150
    knots in preparation for the 100-knot slow landing. This was the last
    radio call Swede 12 heard from Swede 11. [Encl (17), (19)]

    98. MP reported his HMD flickered shortly after converting. Near
    simultaneously, a momentary caution displayed in his HMD that he
    perceived to be engine-related and then the HMD flickered out. While
    MP considered missed approach options, the HMD came back. [Encl (17)]

And from the evaluation:

    19. Primary factors contributing to the mishap can be traced back to
                    event that occurred at 13:32:05. This event induced
    failures of both primary radios,                       the TACAN, and
    the ILS. [FF 100, 101, 126-129]

    20. Additionally, it is probable that the HMD and PCDs were not
    operational for at least three distinct periods. [FF 98, 103, 104,
    106, 114, 132-136, 141]

That's definitely not what happened and not what the report says.

Also, this is a STOVL aircraft, and I suspect the procedures are completely different.

> * and the [jet’s] backup radio was, at least partially, functional*

What does "at least partially functional" even mean?

Either a radio lets you communicate on the frequency you need or it doesn't.

That seems reductive in an advanced stealth fighter that has frequency hopping, anti-jamming comms system using computer controlled phased array antennas. The F35 has at least 11 different types of comms systems (VHF x4, UHF x2, HAVEQUICK, SINCGARS, Link-16, etc). So a lot of functionality can be lost without basic unencrypted radio comms goes down.