Learning Not to Trust the All-In Podcast in Ten Minutes

Re:Learning Not to Trust the All-In Podcast in Ten Minutes by lmm on Thursday November 07, 2024 @07:15PM (#42082679)

> There is little-to-zero validation or uniqueness check currently, and there are near-zero verifiable data points. We can count envelopes/ballots and eyeball signatures, and there is batch-level attachment between the two. Everything else is “trust me bro”-level security, relying on the assumption of a non-existent high-security environment.

OK, and what is it that ID checking would change about this?

> Papers referring to voter ID disenfranchisement rest almost entirely on address-field-correctness deficiency (people move)

And? Supposing that's so, what difference does it make?

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Re:Learning Not to Trust the All-In Podcast in Ten Minutes by the_optimist on Thursday November 07, 2024 @09:45PM (#42083601)

A) repeating: ID check is productive at 1) registration - ensure eligibility and 2) at ballot casting - ensure the voter is registered and unique. The inverse is true without ID: no insuring eligibility and no ensuring either registration or uniqueness. Because of these deficiencies, it is impossible to identify even the most basic forms of fraud.

B) It’s administrative and readily-solved.

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Re:Learning Not to Trust the All-In Podcast in Ten Minutes by lmm on Thursday November 07, 2024 @11:07PM (#42084045)

> ID check is productive at 1) registration - ensure eligibility and 2) at ballot casting - ensure the voter is registered and unique. The inverse is true without ID: no insuring eligibility and no ensuring either registration or uniqueness.

So what is the concrete difference an ID check makes to the process, and what concrete attack does it prevent? You already get your name checked and crossed off the list, in a world with an ID check you would... get your name checked and crossed off the list?

> It’s administrative and readily-solved.

Then why hasn't it been?

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