As with a lot of philosophy, the argument turns out to actually be much more about defining terms being used than the objects those terms are referring to. I mean when you are making an argument about "x is the same as y because..." your philosophical argument is actually about what should be meant by the same instead of any particular properties of x or y.
The article seems to be digging at the existence of a few categories of proofs
* proofs that are trivially transformed into one another
* proofs that use substantially similar arguments that don't necessary have a direct transformation
* proofs that arrive at the same destination through a much different path that have no obvious transformation to another proof
So the question is: how easy does it have to be to transform one proof to another in order for them to be considered "the same"?
One extreme is "the slightest change in wording makes a proof unique"
The other extreme is "any two proofs of the same concept are by definition the same proof"
I would argue that neither extreme is particularly useful, because both are just obvious. One means "these are different sheets of paper" and the other means "these are both proofs of X", neither of which are interesting statements.
What is an interesting statement is commentary on the path made to a proof and the differences in paths to proving a statement. Both in the ability to transform one into another easily to show similarity, and in the difficulty to transform one into another to show divergence.
I strongly assume this would be hard.
There's obviously a sense in which they're the same, but at the proof level, I would be surprised if that's a particularly useful sense, because the whole point of a proof is that it's the journey, not the destination. Even within the same "level," in your terms.
That said, I think you can consider whether two proofs belong to the same "level" or not. Consider by analogy whether a particular Turing machine halts. You can look at the sequence of configurations of the Turing machine at each step. Since the evolution of the machine's configuration is deterministic, any configuration along a "halting path" ends up in the same final configuration (i.e., the first configuration in a halting state).
But that's too difficult in some cases. Most of the Goodstein sequences reach extraordinarily high values before coming back down. How can we prove they all eventually reach 0? Even at small values of n, the sequence length of G(n) requires something on the order of the Ackermann function to specify bounds. We can't inspect these sequences directly to prove whether they reach 0. Instead we create a "parallel" sequence to a Goodstein sequence. Then we prove there exists an algorithm that maps from each item in the parallel sequence to an item in the Goodstein sequence such that both sequences are well-ordered and decreasing. If the parallel sequence reaches 0, then so does the Goodstein sequence. You could think of this as one Turing machine computing the configurations of another Turing machine or perhaps one branch of a tree "cross-predicting" the items along another branch. You aren't just following the branch to its end. In this sense, the proof occurs at a higher "level".
This concept is known as ordinal analysis and one can consider the proof-theoretic ordinal of any theory T. If T_1 and T_2 both prove a specific theorem and have the same proof-theoretic ordinal, you could consider the two proofs to occur on the same "level". Interestingly, Peano Arithmetic can prove that any specific Goodstein sequence reaches 0 but not that all Goodstein sequences reach 0—this requires a more powerful formal system. So if you prove a specific sequence reaches 0 using the more powerful system, I would say that's a fundamentally different proof.