This cannot be more further from the truth. Amongst the newcomers, it is rather popular nowadays for them to use Flatpak-bundled apps, especially with the rise of SteamOS (the Deck essentially) lots of Linux newcomers are in fact first exposed to Flatpak and running untrusted executables in a sandbox.
And the most prominent "untrusted executable" today to those newcomers has to be Bottles, which is a nice GUI wrapper for Wine and is sandboxed (if you enable wine-wayland, of course).
But I don't think a game purchased through steam counts as untrusted.
As compared to running untrusted programs completely naked?
>But I don't think a game purchased through steam counts as untrusted.
Bottles is there for people to run any Win32 program, not just Steam games. And I shouldn't have to tell you how many malicious Win32 programs there are.
Containerization on Linux was never intended to be a security feature for totally untrusted, malicious code. It's isolation for trusted code. If your scenario relies on securely running untrusted executables in a Linux container you are doing stupid things.
You see: If you want absolute security, for sure, go for a full-fledged VM! Or run something like QubesOS. It is a completely reasonable decision.
However, malice certainly has degrees, and the "mildly malicious" programs most likely cannot take advantage of sandbox escaping exploits. If Flatpak can stop 95% of all attacks (relative to running a program completely without sandboxing), that is already a win in my book.
But I will note again that X11 is a big hole (as in, almost a complete free-for-all) for sandbox escaping in Flatpak.
I'm done with this thread, have a nice day.
And besides that, "these threats are off in fantasy land" is an invalid defense in my opinion, considering the (quite sophisticated) XZ Utils backdoor happened not too long ago! Like I said, if such an attack towards X11 hasn't been deployed in the wild, it can only suggest such endeavor is unprofitable, not because the threats are fantastical.
If the attacker decided to backdoor an utility and make use of X11, it is most likely the backdoored utility will listen to keyboard events, read the bitmaps of other X11 clients.
And there's nothing that can stop the backdoor from doing so on X11...
Anyways, if you are saying the Wayland security policies are unneeded because there hasn't been an attack on X11 (this is the fundamental disagreement between us), consider the following: You don't install doors in your premise, because there hasn't been a case of burglary in your neighborhood?