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Re:A deep dive into Linux's new mseal syscall by ykonstant on Friday October 25, 2024 @12:55PM (#41947112)
Interesting. The article mentions "spicy discussions" in the kernel mailing list. Is there any insider who can summarize objections and concerns? I tend to avoid reading the mailing list itself since it can get too spicy, and my headaches are already strong enough!

The mechanism itself seems reasonable, but I am surprised that something like this doesn't already exist in the kernel.

Re:A deep dive into Linux's new mseal syscall by ziddoap on Friday October 25, 2024 @01:04PM (#41947207)
Not sure if there was much more to it than the thread linked to, but it was basically Linus being Linus. He said stuff that made sense in a pretty blunt fashion.

There were flags proposed that allowed the seal to be ignored.

>So you say "we can't munmap in this *one* place, but all others ignore the sealing".

Later was the spice.

>And dammit, once something is sealed, it is SEALED. None of this crazy "one place honors the sealing, random other places do not".

And later, even spicier, Linus says that seals cannot be ignored and that is non-negotiable. Any further suggestions to ignore a seal via a flag would result in the person being added to Linus' ignore list. (He, of course, said this with some profanities and capitals sprinkled in.)

Re:A deep dive into Linux's new mseal syscall by js2 on Friday October 25, 2024 @01:41PM (#41947570)
Wasn't just Linus. Earlier, from Theo de Raadt:

> I don't think you understand the problem space well enough to come up with your own solution for it. I spent a year on this, and ship a complete system using it. You are asking such simplistic questions above it shocks me.

https://lwn.net/ml/linux-kernel/[email protected]...

Via https://lwn.net/Articles/948129/

Re:A deep dive into Linux's new mseal syscall by 0xbadcafebee on Friday October 25, 2024 @02:49PM (#41948384)
Not a great perspective... "It took me a year [or more] to understand this. The fact that you don't understand it shocks me." Dude, not everybody's as smart or experienced as you. Here's an opportunity to be a mentor.
Re:A deep dive into Linux's new mseal syscall by nativeit on Friday October 25, 2024 @03:17PM (#41948640)
> Google has no shortage of experienced developers who could have reviewed this submission before it was posted publicly, but that does not appear to have happened, with the result that a relatively inexperienced developer was put into a difficult position. Feedback on the proposal was resisted rather than listened to. The result was an interaction that pleased nobody.
Re:A deep dive into Linux's new mseal syscall by refulgentis on Friday October 25, 2024 @03:41PM (#41948875)
> Google has no shortage of experienced developers who could have reviewed this submission before it was posted publicly,

You'd be surprised. My understanding from folks on Chrome OS is they've already shedded most, if not all, of the most experienced old hands. (n.b. Chrome OS was absorbed by Android and development is, by and large, ceased on it according to same sources directly, and indirectly via Blind.)

Re:A deep dive into Linux's new mseal syscall by vlovich123 on Friday October 25, 2024 @04:34PM (#41949403)
My reading of this is a lot more generous to the maintainers and a lot less sympathetic to the author than yours is. The maintainers highlighted the problems and the author came back basically with "I don't believe you so let's go with my approach to stay more general" - it's one thing to disagree, it's another to straight up not acknowledge the feedback. The author ate a lot of very senior people's time arguing instead of listening to them and learning from their experience and that was justifiably frustrating forcing much more direct feedback. The kind of mistake the author made - having to enforce at each individual syscall level instead of it being a protection on the memory itself enforced on all accesses - indicates a poor understanding of how to think about security and build security APIs which is a problem when you're proposing a security API.

It's particularly impressive how misguided the patch is given that they took inspiration from the OpenBSD API implementation, changed both API & implementation, & then argued with both Linus and Theo who started Linux & OpenBSD respectively and were trying to give direct feedback about how OpenBSD is different and why it took the approach it did.

Hopefully the author has taken the more forceful feedback as a learning opportunity about listening to feedback when the people giving it to you have a lot more experience. Or their team is coaching them about what went wrong now that this became so visible to learn what they got wrong.

From Matthew Wilcox who is another senior Linux maintainer:

> I concur with Theo & Linus. You don't know what you're doing. I think the underlying idea of mimmutable() is good, but how you've split it up and how you've implemented it is terrible.

It's delivered directly and bluntly but it's not mean or personal. The author proposed a bad patch & argued from a position of ignorance.

Re:A deep dive into Linux's new mseal syscall by jorvi on Friday October 25, 2024 @07:49PM (#41951182)
> The maintainers highlighted the problems and the author came back basically with "I don't believe you so let's go with my approach to stay more general" - it's one thing to disagree, it's another to straight up not acknowledge the feedback.

Isn't that the Linux kernel in a nutshell?

Of the top of my head I can name:

- The zram maintainer that's for a few years been blocking the patches that add the zpool api to zram. This would go a long way to unifying zram and zswap in the future.

- TuxOnIce being permablocked by some heels-in-sand maintainers until the kernel diverged to much and the patch writer gave up. This one would have fixed hibernation on Linux.. in other words, hibernation still sucks because of these maintainers.

- Of course the trench warfare all the C-proficient maintainers are waging to chase all the Rust-in-Linux people away, lest they have to learn Rust. ~80% of CVEs are memory-related, so you could say that in say.. 10 years time, ~80% of the CVEs happening in the Linux kernel are the legacy of Ted & co.

Re:A deep dive into Linux's new mseal syscall by vlovich123 on Friday October 25, 2024 @08:24PM (#41951430)
You can roughly be:

1. Wrong and ignorant

2. Wrong and knowledgeable

3. Right and ignorant

4. Right and knowledgeable

There's also when there's just a disagreement of opinion because you weight the tradeoffs differently, in which case there's less of a right or wrong.

The main difference is that in those cases the people involved were in camps 2-4 or simply weighted tradeoffs differently. In this case the author seemed much more clearly in camp 1.

Regarding the claim that "this one would have fixed hibernation on Linux" - maybe, but it's hard to evaluate a road not taken. It could have made other tradeoffs or caused other issues down the road that aren't visible to you right now because it didn't get mainlined or maybe hibernation would still have been broken. Or maybe it would have been hunky dorry. But it kind of doesn't matter because the author in this case was clearly wrong (i.e. the patch wouldn't have achieved the goal it set out to do and would have predictably caused vulnerabilities to become possible in the future as the kernel evolved).

As for Rust-in-Linux, it sounds like your not actually up to date [1]. I'll forgive Ted's emotional volatility at the infamous filesystem talk as he's been much more calm about it now:

> There is a need for documentation and tutorials on how to write filesystem code in idiomatic Rust. He said that he has a lot to learn; he is willing to do that, but needs help on what to learn.

I'd say "trench resistance" not warfare. The Rust movement is trying to shift the daily work of ~15k developers in a mostly bazaar development model. There's going to be resistance and push back and some of it will feel unfair to the Rust folks and some will feel unfair to the C folk and both will be right.

[1] https://lwn.net/Articles/991062/

Re:A deep dive into Linux's new mseal syscall by jorvi on Friday October 25, 2024 @10:49PM (#41952140)
> But it kind of doesn't matter because the author in this case was clearly wrong (i.e. the patch wouldn't have achieved the goal it set out to do and would have predictably caused vulnerabilities to become possible in the future as the kernel evolved).

I was speaking in general terms, of how recognizable the "heels-in-the-sand" attitude is. In this particular case yes, it does sound right that the current "mseal" proposal / patches is not up to snuff.

Edit: also reading through it again, props to Theo's response. Stern but with a lot of edification.

> Regarding the claim that "this one would have fixed hibernation on Linux" - maybe, but it's hard to evaluate a road not taken. It could have made other tradeoffs or caused other issues down the road that aren't visible to you right now because it didn't get mainlined or maybe hibernation would still have been broken.

The nice thing about TuxOnIce is that it would have pushed large parts of hibernation into userspace, which would have made it much more versatile and much easier to iterate on.

> As for Rust-in-Linux, it sounds like your not actually up to date [1].

One of the main Rust spearhead developers felt the need to quit, and almost immediately thereafter Asahi Lina posted an article about how "a subset of C kernel developers just seem determined to make the lives of the Rust maintainers as difficult as possible." By my count that is 0-2. How is that "some of it will feel unfair to the Rust folks and some will feel unfair to the C folk"?

> I'd say "trench resistance" not warfare. The Rust movement is trying to shift the daily work of ~15k developers in a mostly bazaar development model.

They're not trying to shift the daily work of ~15k developers. They're asking for some shims, stubs, adaptations, and some general flexibility & willingness. They're not expecting everyone to write Rust within the next 18 months.

[0]https://vt.social/@lina/113045455229442533

Re:A deep dive into Linux's new mseal syscall by vlovich123 on Saturday October 26, 2024 @02:36PM (#41956754)
I think you really missed what I was trying to say about the hibernate stuff. May be helpful to reread.

> One of the main Rust spearhead developers felt the need to quit, and almost immediately thereafter Asahi Lina posted an article about how "a subset of C kernel developers just seem determined to make the lives of the Rust maintainers as difficult as possible." By my count that is 0-2.

I again refer you to the article I linked. The drama has greatly subsided and it seems like people are talking through the differences. While there's some unfortunate intransigence (which may have since been clarified btw), there's also a lot of premature eagerness for pushing Rust into Linux. It's a shame for sure that Wedson burned out and left. If nothing else at least 6 months after that departure the conversation tonally is very very different.

> Linus Torvalds admonished the group that he did not want to talk about every subsystem supporting Rust at this time; getting support into some of them is sufficient for now. When Airlie asked what would happen when some subsystem blocks progress, Torvalds answered "that's my job"

> Torvalds pointed out that there are kernel features that are currently incompatible with Rust; that is impeding Rust support overall. He mentioned modversions in particular; that problem is being worked on. The list of blocking features is getting shorter, he said, but it still includes kernel features that people need.

> Brauner said that nobody has ever declared that the filesystem abstractions would not be merged; the discussion is all about the details of how that will happen.

Important to note that the filesystem abstraction conflict is what led to the resignation in the first place. The maintainers are taking a very different position, possibly because of non-public conversations that have happened in the intervening time.

> Gleixner said that, 20 years ago, there had been a lot of fear and concern surrounding the realtime kernel work; he is seeing the same thing now with regard to Rust. We cannot let that fear drive things, he said. Torvalds said that Rust has been partially integrated for two years. That is nothing, he said; the project to build the kernel with Clang took a decade, and that was the same old language.

> As the session closed, though, the primary outcome may well have been expressed by Torvalds, who suggested telling people that getting kernel Rust up to production levels will happen, but it will take years.

It can be frustrating to work on something when the time scale for any kind of observable success can be a decade or more, especially when you see the obstacles as other people on the project. I know I would not have the patience and I'm a huge fan of Rust. Keep in mind that Rust itself isn't actually able to support all the kernel use-cases. There's stuff like which platforms that Rust supports as "tier 1" because the kernel needs to support those platforms - the most likely success case will be having the Rust frontend be able to use GCC as the backend and that work is nowhere near (neither is getting tier-1 automation support for those platforms). Those themselves are years out and so it's understandable that maintainers are trying to figure out how the proposed abstractions will work and how roles and responsibilities will be managed.

> They're not trying to shift the daily work of ~15k developers. They're asking for some shims, stubs, adaptations, and some general flexibility & willingness. They're not expecting everyone to write Rust within the next 18 months.

I mean it's pretty clear that the goal of the "Rust in Linux" project is to stop having any new C code in the Linux kernel. No one is claiming in 18 months but that's clearly the direction and it shouldn't be surprising for there to be an emotional reaction to that, especially from the maintainers who might perceive that as a threat if they only know C, even if that seems illogical to you. And more importantly, maintainers need to do a lot of work and they hadn't signed up to maintain Rust abstractions so there's another emotional aspect of it where they feel someone else is imposing a new environment on them.

Re:A deep dive into Linux's new mseal syscall by f1shy on Saturday October 26, 2024 @12:44PM (#41955889)
Every time I see somebody insinuate that all the CVEs would not be there if the kernel was written in Rust, I yawn... The idea that a programming language is a silver bullet is just stupid.
Re:A deep dive into Linux's new mseal syscall by ArtixFox on Saturday October 26, 2024 @01:08PM (#41956079)
who is saying all? pls show me the people who are bruh. its always 70% of the cve's are cuz of things that rust fixes blah blah

cmon, lets not lie.

Re:A deep dive into Linux's new mseal syscall by f1shy on Saturday October 26, 2024 @02:22PM (#41956650)
Would you believe me if I said 65%?
Re:A deep dive into Linux's new mseal syscall by ArtixFox on Sunday October 27, 2024 @12:11AM (#41959811)
how does that matter? calling 70% ALL is a very funny thing that i can only see on hn
Re:A deep dive into Linux's new mseal syscall by terribleperson on Friday October 25, 2024 @06:57PM (#41950709)
The time of the people who maintain the free and open source software we rely on is not free. From the people I've talked to, maintainers of successful projects are overworked and underappreciated.

Mentorship from one of those people would be valuable, but arguing with them about the implementation of something you don't understand isn't how you get that mentorship.

Re:A deep dive into Linux's new mseal syscall by Onavo on Friday October 25, 2024 @07:03PM (#41950780)
> Mentorship from one of those people would be valuable, but arguing with them about the implementation of something you don't understand isn't how you get that mentorship.

Actually that's exactly how you can provoke them into explaining themselves. Too many experienced people sit in their ivory towers and basically appeal to their authority, "I wrote a kernel therefore I know everything, <insert profanity here>". There's a reason why Cunningham's Law exist, "The best way to get the right answer on the Internet is not to ask a question, it's to post the wrong answer."

Re:A deep dive into Linux's new mseal syscall by Affric on Saturday October 26, 2024 @05:18AM (#41953631)
Thank you.

That was beautiful.

Demonstrated the difference in design/engineering philosophies from two of the greats.

Re:A deep dive into Linux's new mseal syscall by benreesman on Saturday October 26, 2024 @10:11AM (#41954820)
You’re asking me how a watch works, let’s just try to keep an eye on the time.

https://youtu.be/vkYqs9iuJqY?feature=shared&t=109

Re:A deep dive into Linux's new mseal syscall by santiagobasulto on Saturday October 26, 2024 @04:17AM (#41953385)
Is that considered "spicy"? Is the sensitivity threshold maybe too low?
Re:A deep dive into Linux's new mseal syscall by f1shy on Saturday October 26, 2024 @12:45PM (#41955895)
Extremely too low. My personal opinion: people who cannot take that kind of criticism, has no place in such a project. Period.
Re:A deep dive into Linux's new mseal syscall by f1shy on Saturday October 26, 2024 @12:32PM (#41955813)
And the reason why SW development sucks in enterprise, is the lack of people that can speak clearly like Linus.
Re:A deep dive into Linux's new mseal syscall by greenavocado on Friday October 25, 2024 @02:05PM (#41947866)
https://lwn.net/ml/linux-kernel/[email protected]....

    From:   Theo de Raadt <deraadt-AT-openbsd.org>
    To:   Jeff Xu <jeffxu-AT-google.com>

    > On Wed, Oct 18, 2023 at 8:17 AM Matthew Wilcox <[email protected]> wrote:
    > >
    > > Let's start with the purpose.  The point of mimmutable/mseal/whatever is
    > > to fix the mapping of an address range to its underlying object, be it
    > > a particular file mapping or anonymous memory.  After the call succeeds,
    > > it must not be possible to make any address in that virtual range point
    > > into any other object.
    > >
    > > The secondary purpose is to lock down permissions on that range.
    > > Possibly to fix them where they are, possibly to allow RW->RO transitions.
    > >
    > > With those purposes in mind, you should be able to deduce for any syscall
    > > or any madvise(), ... whether it should be allowed.
    > >
    > I got it.
    > 
    > IMO: The approaches mimmutable() and mseal() took are different, but
    > we all want to seal the memory from attackers and make the linux
    > application safer.

    I think you are building mseal for chrome, and chrome alone.

    I do not think this will work out for the rest of the application space
    because

    1) it is too complicated
    2) experience with mimmutable() says that applications don't do any of it
    themselves, it is all in execve(), libc initialization, and ld.so.
    You don't strike me as an execve, libc, or ld.so developer.
Re:A deep dive into Linux's new mseal syscall by greenavocado on Friday October 25, 2024 @02:09PM (#41947907)

    From:   Matthew Wilcox <willy-AT-infradead.org>
    To:   Jeff Xu <jeffxu-AT-google.com>

    ...

    Yes, thank you for demonstrating that you have no idea what you need to
    block.

    > It is practical to keep syscall extentable, when the business logic is the same.

    I concur with Theo & Linus.  You don't know what you're doing.  I think
    the underlying idea of mimmutable() is good, but how you've split it up
    and how you've implemented it is terrible.

    ...
Re:A deep dive into Linux's new mseal syscall by lathiat on Friday October 25, 2024 @01:36PM (#41947535)
Re:A deep dive into Linux's new mseal syscall by ykonstant on Friday October 25, 2024 @01:39PM (#41947553)
Very nice, thanks!

Edit: I always find it funny that these articles on the mailing list tend to read like a sports announcer describing a boxing match!