Transitioning the Use of Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Lengths

Re:Transitioning the Use of Cryptographic Algorithms and Key... by Joel_Mckay on Monday October 21, 2024 @07:51PM (#41909759)

Rumors suggest a toy 22bit RSA cipher factorization was recently demonstrated in China on D-wave quantum annealing platforms, and several paper details of the scaling potential were censored.

i.e. the NIST advice to incorporate quantum resistant algorithms shouldn't be taken lightly. For some, transitioning means wrapping a well-tested RSA system in something newer like FIPS 203, 204, or 205.

We live in interesting times for certain, as gnugpg with Kyber support has static build fails on some platforms (libassuan 3.0.1 bug). =3

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Re:Transitioning the Use of Cryptographic Algorithms and Key... by tptacek on Monday October 21, 2024 @07:57PM (#41909797)

I don't know of anyone working in the space that takes that demonstration seriously, but I didn't go digging much; let me know if you find someone. For a lot of cryptography engineers, the mention of "D-Wave" is enough to shut down the inquiry.

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Re:Transitioning the Use of Cryptographic Algorithms and Key... by Joel_Mckay on Monday October 21, 2024 @08:03PM (#41909844)

That was my assumption as well for years, but when RSA starts to fall it raises more than 1 question.

We will be wrapping RSA 2048bit in Kyber in the next few weeks, because planning for the worst and hoping for the best is good policy. =3

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Re:Transitioning the Use of Cryptographic Algorithms and Key... by tptacek on Monday October 21, 2024 @08:09PM (#41909880)

I'm referring to the specific D-Wave China RSA demonstration you're talking about, which I've been reading cryptographers dunking on.

Cards on the table, my position on quantum cryptanalysis remains: "Rodents of unusual size? I don't think they exist." It's a very big deal because it's a full employment program for people working on novel asymmetric schemes.

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