I get that it's a prioritization issue. I've worked at places where legacy software had poor security practices and it's often a judgment call as to the risk of just letting it be vs. taking the time to rewrite whatever insecure portion remained. Often the decision is to leave it when it's a one-off project that will be shut down within a month, there is a limited attack surface involved, and the data being stored insecurely is very low value. On the other hand, security issues affecting the very core of a website (the login system that 100% of a company's revenue depends on) should get addressed as soon as the vulnerability is discovered. Additionally, they state that a server was compromised... it's not clear whether this was a SQL injection exploit that happened to display the users table remotely with no privilege escalation, or whether the server was compromised via a poorly chosen SSH password or similar and they may be dealing with a situation where rogue code is still living on one or more servers.
I saw some mentions of MD5 in forums and some handwaving about how other scripts use custom password security, but nothing definitive.
We looked at aMember for a project several years ago, before we switched to Django for all our development so I haven't kept up on what is available security-wise on PHP.
4.1.3 release: http://www.amember.com/forum/threads/amember-pro-version-4-1... states "Removed user.pass variable from email templates. Plain text password in not available anymore."
4.1.6 release: http://www.amember.com/forum/threads/amember-pro-version-4-1... states "Closes #448 - and do not save md5 passwords at all".
User issue: http://www.amember.com/forum/threads/urgent-amember-v4-1-12-... "Unfortunately, in the email received by customers, the password comes out encrypted like $P$BkTNDykCkTfsOqHwsV4TT2/"
The hash format indicates it's using PHPass: http://cvsweb.openwall.com/cgi/cvsweb.cgi/projects/phpass/Pa... which is based on MD5, but with the log of the number of rounds indicated by the first character after the $P$ prefix. In the forum example, it's "B" which is 11 making it 2^11 rounds. The remainder is an 8 character salt plus checksum. PHPass is authored by "Solar Designer" or Alexander Peslyak, also the author of John the Ripper and respected in the security community: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alexander_Peslyak so is likely pretty solid.
The preferred (most secure) hashing method supported by phpass is the OpenBSD-style Blowfish-based bcrypt, also supported with our public domain crypt_blowfish package (for C applications), and known in PHP as CRYPT_BLOWFISH, with a fallback to BSDI-style extended DES-based hashes, known in PHP as CRYPT_EXT_DES, and a last resort fallback to MD5-based salted and variable iteration count password hashes implemented in phpass itself (also referred to as portable hashes).
To ensure that the fallbacks will never occur, PHP 5.3.0+ or the Suhosin patch may be used. PHP 5.3.0+ and Suhosin integrate crypt_blowfish into the PHP interpreter such that bcrypt is available for use by PHP scripts even if the host system lacks support for it.
Salting prevents effective use of rainbow tables. It does not protect against brute force attacks, which are now incredibly cheap.
Individually salting passwords was best practice internet eons ago, not now.
Best practice is to use a work-adjustable scheme such as provided by bcrypt.
SHA1 and MD5 are trivial to crack as there are many OpenCL implementations made specifically to crack salted passwords.