Re:Creating a rogue CA certificate with MD5 hash collisions
by tptacek on Tuesday December 30, 2008 @03:44PM
(#414648)
The attack you are talking about it completely trivial. It relies on you being too dumb to even care if you have a real certificate. The attack Sotirov, et al have discovered is extremely hard. It works even if you check certificates.
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Re:Creating a rogue CA certificate with MD5 hash collisions
by gojomo on Tuesday December 30, 2008 @04:12PM
(#414684)
I think that was modoc's original point, in response to the 'stella' comment. SSL, even if vulnerable to Sotirov-level impersonation attacks, still protects from other idiot-level attacks.
So you might be tricked into setting up encrypted communication to one of the (small) N groups that have the knowledge/budget to do a Sotirov attack, but at least you still won't have identity details hijacked by (large) M others, because even broken cert-checking protects against them.