Re:Creating a rogue CA certificate with MD5 hash collisions
by stcredzero on Tuesday December 30, 2008 @03:41PM
(#414644)
The customers that bought certificates should be getting an SHA1 certificate from the CAs. Why shouldn't there be a sweeping revocation? Any web apps that are dependent on rapid response to problems like this will be able to respond quickly. If things are handled properly, we should see abandonment of MD5 certs in a matter of days. Taking more time just gives time to the exploiters.
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Re:Creating a rogue CA certificate with MD5 hash collisions
by fhars on Tuesday December 30, 2008 @04:55PM
(#414727)
A sweeping revocation wouldn't work, as you can only revoke certifcates that have not been tampered with. You must issue a SHA-1 certificate to everyone and then change every piece of software that uses certificates not to trust certificates with an MD5 hash in the trust chain. If someone else has successfully performed this attack, he might posses a CA certificate that is valid until 2038 and you have no way to know about it until he uses it against you.