Re:Creating a rogue CA certificate with MD5 hash collisions
by tptacek on Tuesday December 30, 2008 @03:46PM
(#414651)
If you're saying, "we shouldn't do anything rash to mitigate an attack that requires Arjen Lenstra and a specially tuned cluster of PS3s to accomplish", then that makes sense.
If you're saying, "we shouldn't do anything rash because certificates don't break encryption, only authentication", then you are perpetuating a really dangerous myth about SSL security.
Under that scenario, then you've already lost your data (although I'd still hold it's better to have your CC stolen by one person, rather than two), so yes, that's bad. However, that's not the scenario that I've been discussing here. This thread came under the debate about the risks and issues with revoking all those certs immediately, versus not.