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Re:Creating a rogue CA certificate with MD5 hash collisions by modoc on Tuesday December 30, 2008 @03:17PM (#414610)
The scenario under discussion (at least I as understood it from this particular thread of comments) is if we don't revoke all the compromisable certs. The scenario is NOT that I am connected to an attacker who has successfully used this attack against me.

Under that scenario, then you've already lost your data (although I'd still hold it's better to have your CC stolen by one person, rather than two), so yes, that's bad. However, that's not the scenario that I've been discussing here. This thread came under the debate about the risks and issues with revoking all those certs immediately, versus not.

Re:Creating a rogue CA certificate with MD5 hash collisions by tptacek on Tuesday December 30, 2008 @03:46PM (#414651)
If you're saying, "we shouldn't do anything rash to mitigate an attack that requires Arjen Lenstra and a specially tuned cluster of PS3s to accomplish", then that makes sense.

If you're saying, "we shouldn't do anything rash because certificates don't break encryption, only authentication", then you are perpetuating a really dangerous myth about SSL security.